The specificity of skill acquisition: Is it task related? by Darlaston-Jones, Dawn
Edith Cowan University 
Research Online 
Theses : Honours Theses 
1999 
The specificity of skill acquisition: Is it task related? 
Dawn Darlaston-Jones 
Edith Cowan University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.ecu.edu.au/theses_hons 
 Part of the Educational Psychology Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Darlaston-Jones, D. (1999). The specificity of skill acquisition: Is it task related?. https://ro.ecu.edu.au/
theses_hons/501 
This Thesis is posted at Research Online. 
https://ro.ecu.edu.au/theses_hons/501 
Edith Cowan University 
  
Copyright Warning 
  
 
  
You may print or download ONE copy of this document for the purpose 
of your own research or study. 
 
The University does not authorize you to copy, communicate or 
otherwise make available electronically to any other person any 
copyright material contained on this site. 
 
You are reminded of the following: 
 
 Copyright owners are entitled to take legal action against persons 
who infringe their copyright. 
 
 A reproduction of material that is protected by copyright may be a 
copyright infringement. Where the reproduction of such material is 
done without attribution of authorship, with false attribution of 
authorship or the authorship is treated in a derogatory manner, 
this may be a breach of the author’s moral rights contained in Part 
IX of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth). 
 
 Courts have the power to impose a wide range of civil and criminal 
sanctions for infringement of copyright, infringement of moral 
rights and other offences under the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth). 
Higher penalties may apply, and higher damages may be awarded, 
for offences and infringements involving the conversion of material 
into digital or electronic form.
The Specificity of Skill Acquisition: 
Is it Task Related? 
Dawn Darlaston-Jones 
A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of the 
Requirements for the Award of 
Bachelor of Arts (Psychology) Honours 
Faculty of Community Services, Education and Social Sciences 
Edith Cowan University 
29'" October I 999 
Statement 
I declare that this written assignment is my own work and does not include: 
(i) material from published sources used without proper acknowledgment; 
or 
(ii) material copied from the work of other students. 
Dawn Darlaston-.loncs 
USE OF THESIS 
 
 
The Use of Thesis statement is not included in this version of the thesis. 
Skill A~qu1s1!iun ~~~~~Tusk II. 
The Speciticity of Skill Acquisition: Is it Task Related'! 
Abstract 
The plethora of research into the area of skill acquisition and transfer has resulted in 
con!licting conclusions regarding the nature of transfer. Some researchers have found 
skill transfer to be specific to the items experienced during training (Logan, I 988, 
alphabet-arithmetic task; Masson, 1986, reverse reading task). Others have found 
transfer to be general (Speelman & Kirsner, I 997, syllogism task) or both general and 
specific in the same task (Greig & Speelman, 1999, algebra task). This study 
investigated the assumption that the task involved dictates the specific nature of skill 
acquisition and transfer. Sixty participants drawn from the Edith Cowan School of 
Psychology volunteer register were randomly assigned to four groups, with each group 
performing one of the afore mentioned tasks. In phase I, learning was detennined by 
the decreased Reaction Time (RT) for each participant from block I to block 8. Phase 2 
involved participants being trained on a different task using one set of items and then in 
the transfer phase (3) participants perfonned the same task but with new items. 
Compa6ng RT data from block I phase 2 and block I phase 3 and from block I phase 3 
to block I 0 phase 2 assessed transfer. The syllogism task resulted in the most skill 
transfer due to the generalisability of the strategy employed in solving the syllogisms. 
This was followed by the algebra task, the alphabet-arithmetic task, and the reversed 
reading task. The results confirmed the a priori predictions that the nature of transfer is 
a function of the task involved. 
Author: Dawn Darlaston-Jones 
Supervisor: Dr Craig Speelman 
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The Specificity of Skill Acquisition: Is it Task Related'? 
Given the relevance of'lcarning and skill acquisition to all domains of' human 
endeavour it is hardly surprising that the topic has resulted in a rlcthora of literature. 
From birth. humans arc lc<trning new skills and achieving milestones in their ability 
to ncgotmtc their world. Consequently, researchers arc equally avid in striving to 
understand the cognitive processes that enable skill acquisition, be it learning to read, 
ride a bike, or fly the space shuttle. 
Defining what is meant by the tenn 'skill' has occupied researchers from a variety of 
domains fer several decades (Adams, 1987). One of the earliest definitions of the 
tenn came from a British psychologist T. H. Pear (1927), and his interpretation of 
what defined 'skill' continues to influence current thinking. Pear's definition held that 
skill was the " . .integration ofwell-adjl''>ted performances, .... skill is acquired and 
fused with natural aptitude" (pp. 480-481). This definition implies the need for both 
capacity and ability. But skill acquisition is distinguished from both in that one might 
have the capacity and ability to perfom1 a task yet be unable to do so because the 
skill has not been learnt (Adams, 1987). 
The importance of understanding the mechanisms underpinning skill acquisition, and 
arguably more importantly, the transfer of skills to new domains, has never been 
greater than it is now at the end of the 20'h century (for reviews, see Adams, 1987; 
Masson, 1990; Singley & Anderson, 1989). With the current emphasis on achieving 
a reliable and competent, multi-skilled workforce the relevance of research in this 
area has increased. Unfortunately several questions pertinent to this issue remain 
unresolved. For example, can workers trained in one domain be effectively 
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redeployed to another task without the need for expensive retraining? h1rthennore, 
arc there ccrt<.lin 'generic' skills that cun he.: transferred hctween roles that would 
reduce those retraining costs'! 
2 
Answers to these questions differ depending on the theoretical perspective of the 
respondent. A number of theories about the way skills arc acquired and generalised 
beyond the training context have been proposed (Anderson 1983, 1 993; Logan, 1 988; 
MacKay, 1982; Newell & Rosenbloom, 1988; Rickard, 1997). Each has been 
developed using a variety of tasks in a range of training situations but researchers 
have yet to gain consensus. 
In reviewing the evidence in support of the major theories, this paper attempts to 
establish the argument that the specificity of skill transfer is a function the task itself 
rather than a result of cognitive processes involved in perfonning a task per se. The 
review begins by offering a brief overview of the mechanisms involved in skill 
acquisition. Of particular importance is the role played by memory and immediate 
feedback. This will be followed by a discussion of Logan's instance theory and 
Anderson's ACT* theory and the specific tasks involved in generating the transfer 
literature. 
Skill Acquisition 
The importance of immediate feedback in tenns of its role in skill acquisition has its 
roots with Thorndike, who, based on his Law of Effect, stated that knowledge of 
results, or reinforcement, automatically emphasised the connection between the 
situation and response without conscious processing (Adams, 1987). Thorndike 
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viewed feedback in terms of a habit-based or behavioural response similar to the 
stimulus-response mechanism of operant conditioning. The opposing view saw the 
benefits of feedback as informational or cognitive, based on awareness, planning, 
reasoning and decision making (Adams, 1987). 
3 
The latter framework presents feedback as a component in a loop whereby the person 
remembers the situation and the given response and combines it with the feedback 
results. On subsequent trials the person recalls the situation, the response and the 
feedback given and makes a decision that eliminates any error embodied in the 
previous response (Anderson. 1987). This argument is a key concept in Anderson's 
ACT* theory of skill acquisition, which will be discussed in detail later, in that 
successful application of production rules results in strengthening of the association 
between the stimulus and the response, leading to faster reaction times. Intuitively 
this argument makes sense. For instance, dancers train in front of large mirrors in 
order to correct their posture and technique and gymnasts videotape their routines to 
refine and improve the fluidity and grace of the perfonnance. 
Empirical research has also supported the need for immediate feedback as a factor in 
improving performance and the acquisition of skill. For example, Lewis and 
Anderson (1985) perfonned an experiment involving a 'Dungeons and Dragons' 
board game. Participants were divided into two conditions, one received immediate 
feedback on perfonnance and the other received no feedback. The game involved 
participants proceeding though the various rooms portrayed in the game. Often these 
rooms would be a dead-end and players had to retrace their path to move fotward. 
Lewis and Anderson (1985) found that participants who received immediate 
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feedback pertaining to their error onthc game performed considerably hctlcr than did 
those who relied on learning by discovery. 
R. C. Anderson, Kulhavy and Andre (I 972) found that the type of feed hack was also 
cmcial to performance. In their view participants needed to arrive at the correct 
answer by themselves because if participants were provided with the correct solution, 
they leamcd only to copy the answer given by the examiner instead of learning the 
skills to generate the answer themselves. So Anderson, ct al. argued it was important 
to only give feedback indicating that an error had been made rather than giving the 
solution. 
Tl1e other significant variable in the skill acquisition equation is the role of working 
memo!)'. Remembering specific items, concepts, solutions and rules plays a large 
part in skill acquisition. Practice, accompanied with accurate feedback allows th(! 
storage of exemplars, which can be used either as a direct solution to a problem 
previously encountered, or as analogous to a new problem. This type of learning is 
referred to as explicit teaming. It is dependent upon conscious processing and intent 
to learn and is sensitive to work load (Kirsner & Speelman, 1998). 
Working memo!)' is defined as a 11 systern for the temporal)' holding and 
manipulation of information during the performance of a range of cognitive tasks" 
(Baddeley, 1986, p.34) and theories of skill acquisition share common ground on the 
role of memory in learning. In the novice stage of learning, knowledge and 
instructions relevant to the perfonnance of?. task are held in working memo!)' and 
assist in the development of a performance strategy or algorithm. With continued 
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exposure to a task there is a refining and improving of'tlw algorithm and the 
individual becomes more competent at pcr/'orming the task. The need to hold large; 
amounts or infonnatinn in working memory declines and as such both thc: sizl! and 
nature of demand is reduced. Over time there is a gradual shi fl from algorithmic 
processing to memory retrieval, leading to automatic perfOrmance, as experience 
with the task is increased (Anderson, 1983; Cheng, 1985; Logan, 1988; Newell, & 
Rosenbloom, 198 I). 
It is this concept of a transition from algorithmic processing to memory retrieval that 
fom1s the basis for Logan's ( !988) instance theory of skill acquisition, which will be 
reviewed in detail later in this review. It also highlights the central issue in the debate 
over the specificity of skill transfer- is transfer from one task to another is based on 
the number of shared task elements between the two tasks (Frensch, 1991, p. 997) or 
is it a function of past exposure to the same situation. (Compton & Logan, 1991; 
Logan, 1988; Logan & Klapp, 1991; Pennington, Nicolich, & Rahm, 1995). 
Those theorists who support the 'shared elements' approach to transfer, argue that 
when a person encounters a new situation or task, he/she would benefit from past 
experience in proportion to the number of similarities between the old and new 
situation (Anderson, 1983; Bovair, Kieras, & Polson, 1990; Kieras & Bovair, 1986; 
Rosenbloom & Newell, 1987; Singley & Anderson, 1989). In contrast, those arguing 
for the opposite view, state that transfer occurs only when both the old and new tasks 
are identical. 
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Edward Thorndike ( 1874-1949) was the pioneer of the 'shared clements' view or skill 
transfCr. Early in his career, Thorndike moved to the Teacher's Training College at 
Columbia University, and it was here tha1 his interest in Jcurning was channelled to 
the domain of education. The assumption inherent in all training programs is that 
skills learnt in the training environment will transfer to situations outside the 
ci;.Jssroom. 
It was this assumption that led Thorndike to fonnulatc his theory of transfer, which 
holds that performance on a task is benefited by past experience only to the extent 
that both tasks share the same components. Based on the foundation laid by 
Thorndike, other associationists built their own arguments in support of the identical 
elements theoty (Anderson, I 983; Crossman, 1959; Trowbridge & Carson, 1932). 
Judd (1908), a contemporary of Thorndike, proposed the opposing view of transfer. 
Judd argued that skills were highly constrained by the context in which they were 
acquired and transfer from one task to another would only occur between items 
experienced during training (Gagne, 1966; Hintzman, 1976). 
Two modem theories of skill acquisition that characterise this dichotomy are Logan's 
Instance Theory ofLeaming, which can be likened to the position held by Judd, and 
Anderson's Adaptive Control ofThought Theory (ACT*), which is similar to the 
view held by Thorndike. Both theories can account for most of the changes that 
occur with learning and skilled behaviour, but they differ in tenns of the specificity 
of transfer (Greig & Speelman, 1999). 
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Logan's ( 1988, 1990) instance theory, fOr example, slates that skills <Jrc highly 
specific to the environment in which they were learned. Therefore perfOrmance on a 
new task would not be hcnclitcd by past learning. In contrast, Anderson's ( JIJR2, 
1983, 1 ()S7, 1 <NO, ! 992) ACT* theory holds that hecausc knowledge is abstract it 
can be applied to situations beyond the training environment and skills can therefore 
be general in nature. 
I 
Both these divergent positions have found support in empirical research, raising the 
question of how can both views can be correct. One possible answer is that the nature 
of the skill acquisition and therefore transfer to new items or events is dictated by the 
nature of the tasks performed. Those tasks that result in specific transfer do so 
because they are inherently specific; that is, there are no general features in the task 
that can be incorporated into a general perfonnance strategy and so no such strategy 
can be developed that would facilitate transfer to another version of the task. 
Conversely, a task that demonstrates general transfer does so because it contains 
properties that can be useful when used to perform a different version of the task. 
Logan's Instance TheOJ)I 
Logan's (1988, 1990, 1992) Instance Theory of Automisation states that learning is 
based on exposure to specific events and that for each exposure a memory for that 
event is stored. In this theory these memories are called instances. The more 
exposure a person receives to a given stimulus the more instances are available lOr 
retrieval. 
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Logan <Jrgues that lltstcr reaction times (RT) on a task arc a function of the amount of 
practice with the task a person has experienced. Faster retrieval of iniOrmation is a 
direct result oft he increased number of instances available I{Jr retrieval mthcr than a 
relincmcnt of a general solution strategy. 
Logan's Instance Theory is fundamentally a memory based theory predicated upon 
three main assumptions: (I) that encoding into memory occurs as an "obligatory, 
unavoidable consequence of attention" to a stimulus (Logan, 1988, p. 493); (2) that 
having attended to a stimulus, retrieval from memory of anything associated with the 
stimulus is obligatory and unavoidable; and (3) that each individual encounter with a 
stimulus is encoded, stored, and retrieved separately. 
According to the instance theory, in the initial stages of learning, performance is 
based on algorithmic processing with the person going through a number of steps to 
find a solution. For example, in learning to multiply 4 x 5 a child might count 4 piles 
of counters with 5 in each pile and then add the total number of counters to arrive at 
the answer, 20. Each time this exercise is performed correctly an instance is stored in 
memory. So that with repeated exposure to the problem 4 x 5 the child has more 
instances of the answer 20 to draw upon and so is less likely to use the algorithm. 
That is, rather than needing to generate the solution, the child simply remembers it. 
The algorithm for solving the problem does not change, rather the database of 
memory instances for the solution increases (Logan, 1988). 
In addition to the three primary assumptions, Logan's Instance Theory also assumes 
that each episode connected with a particular stimulus has an equal chance of 
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rctrievnl so that every time a person performs a task, the memory prot:ess and the 
algorithm compete in a metaphoric 'race'; the pro<.:ess thnt produces a solution first 
controls the response. Retrieving an instance is simply rcc;tlling the p<JSI solution to 
the problem, so the 'rnce' is in effect between generating a solution (i.e., algorithm) 
and remembering an answer (i.e., instance). At the novice stag<.: there ar<.: f<.:w<.:r 
instances available to retrieve, and so the algorithm is more likely to win the race and 
control the response. As the individual becomes more skilled, a greater number of 
instances are stored and the probability of one of them being retrieved faster than the 
processing of the algorithm increases so that the memO I)' process eventually 
dominates the race (Compton & Logan, 1991; Rickard, 1997). 
Collectively these assumptions imply a learning mechanism that is based on the 
''accumulation of separate episodic traces with experience" (Logan, 1988, p. 493) 
whereby practice, and therefore an increased database of instances, ultimately results 
in a tramdtion from algorithmic processing to memol)'-based processing. In addition, 
it is this accumulation of separate episodes that makes the thcol)' an instance theory. 
According to Logan's theory the only difference between skilled performers and the 
novice is the number of instances that the expert has to draw upon. 
One of the assumptions central to the instance theory is that encoding and rct:-icval 
are both "obligatory and unavoidable" consequences of attending. Support for this 
argument has been found in experiments involving incidental and intentional 
learning where participants experienced the same stimulus but with one group being 
instructed to attend to a specific aspect of the stimulus and the other group r•:cciving 
no specific instruction (Boronat & Logan, 1997; Hyde & Jenkins, 1969; Logan & 
Ill 
EthL·rtun. JIN...J.; rvlandh:r. i'J(,7). For exampk, in the Boronat and Logan ( 1')1)7) 
study Jlilrticip;,IJJ\s were presented with word pairs presented in ;1 I r, hlock training 
session. Participants scan:hcd these word pairs f(Jr nH:rnbcrs of;J target category. The 
results or these experiments supporh.:d the assumption that information is cncndcd 
whether it is spccilically attended to or not. 
Another important aspect of Logan's theory concerns the strength of encoding. 
Although Logan argues that encoding occurs automatically, and can offer 
experimental support for his assertion, he counters this statement by saying that not 
all infommtion is encoded to the same degree (Logan, 1988). Consequently the fact 
that an individual is unable to retrieve infonnation relevant to a stimulus does not 
mean necessarily that the infom1ation was not encoded, just that it was inadequately 
encoded. 
Due to the nature oftl:e instance theory, Logan predicts that there can not be any 
transfer between tasks. According to Logan, skill acquisition is based on an 
accumulation of instances that are highly specific to the stimuli encountered. As a 
result, performance on new, albeit similar items, would not be enhanced by past 
learning. Logan demonstrated this with his alphabet-arithmetic task (Logan, 1988; 
Logan & Klapp, 1991) and with a spatial numerosity task (Lassaline & Logan, 
1993). Both these tasks presented participants with a set of items in a training phase 
and a mix of old and new items in a transfer phase. Reaction time for the old items 
were faster than for the new items, which demonstrated that Ieaming from the 
training phase of the experiment could not be of benefit to the pmticipant when tl.oy 
were presented with new items in the transfer phase. This implies that new problems, 
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rcgmdle:-;:-; of any !-iimilarity hetwt:enth~.:m, an.: treated as iftlwy an.: totally new 
(Greig & Speelman, liJIJlJ). 
II 
Palmeri ( 1997) expressed concern over the instance theory's metaphorical "race". 
The theory states that there can only be onr.: "winner" and so implies that it is the first 
instance retrieved tlmt dictates the response. This aspect of the theory offers no 
possibi lily of comparison of responses where evidence in support of one response 
automatically negates all others (Palmeri, 1997). This raises the possibility that the 
first instance retrieved might not be the best or most appropriate solution to the 
problem. 
Palmeri ( 1997) and Rickard ( 1997) have both extended the instance theory to include 
the possibility of retrieving instances that are not identical to the stimulus 
encountered. Palmeri, with his exemplar-based random walk model (EBR W) states 
that all examples of an instance are retrieved in direct proportion to their similarity to 
the presented stimuli. This means that if a new problem is encountered that is similar 
to:. but not identical to:. an instance held in memory, that instance could be retrieved 
to assist in solving the new problem. 
Rickard's component power laws theory (CMPL) offers an alternative to the parallel 
competition between algorithm execution and memory retrieval described by the 
instance theory. Rickard suggests that instead of the two processes competing 
independently in paraUel, that a choice of strategy (i.e., either algorithm execution or 
memory retrieval) is made at the outset of each trial and a prototype of each item is 
strengthened with practice. While this model precludes parallel completion it does 
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not pn .. ·cludc parallel initi:.1tion oflwo or more memory rdrit:v;tl event~. lllt:ref'on.:, tl 
allows the possibility ofmon; than one solution heing considered (Riekard, l'J!J7). 
Anderst111's AC'T* '"l'lu'tJJ:I· 
Anderson's ACT* Theory proposes that skilled behaviour can he considered as 
involving the execution of production rules (Anderson, 1995) which Anderson 
described as one of the "most astounding and important discoveries in psychology" 
(Anderson, 1993, p. l). Production rules arc 'if- then' or 'condition-action' 
I! 
statements .. When the 'if component is matched with infonnation stored in memory a 
particular outcome or action is perfonned - the 'then' component (Anderson, 1993 ). 
With practice, execution of these productions becomes more efficient and therefore 
faster. Thus a general strategy for perfonning is developed and refined with practice 
on the task (Pirolli & Anderson, 1985). 
Underlying Anderson's theory is the distinction between declarative and procedural 
knowledge. Declarative knowledge is knowledge about facts, whereas procedural 
knowledge is the "how" of an action or procedure. Anderson states that these two 
types of knowledge differ fundamentally in their role in skill acquisition (Anderson, 
1982). The use of declarative infommtion to perforn1 a task is slow and ponderous in 
that every fact relating to a stimulus has to be retrieved from long-tem1 memory 
before it can be held in short tenn memory for assessment in terms of its 
appropriateness to the situation. This declarative infonnation can be operated on by 
general problem solving processes such as analogy or means-end analysis. These 
problem-solving processes are referred to as weak because they can be applied to a 
range of problems and are not tied to any particular problem type. Application or 
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these processes result in the limnation of productions that !Cmn lhl! basis or 
procedural knowledge. 
II 
According to the ACT* tlwory. skill acquisition typically comprises three stages; tlu; 
Declarative Sltlgc, the 1\null'h·t~r;e Compilation Sfllge, and finally the Procedural 
Stage. In effect, the ACT* is a reinterpretation of the three stages of skill acquisition 
described by Fitts ( 1964 ). Fitts described the Cognitive Stage, which corresponds to 
Anderson's declarative stage, as involving initial skill acquisition. This stage is 
characterised as being explicit and rule-based, making it slow, resource intensive and 
mistake ridden. Schneider and Shiffrin (I 977) suggest this stage is highly demanding 
of attention and is governed by the limits ofshort-tenn memory. During this stage 
the skill is being mastered so teclmiques such as verbal rehearsal are often employed 
to aid performance (Shiffiin & Schneider, 1977) 
The second stage in Fitts' model is the Associative Stage (Anderson's knowledge 
compilation stage), which involves the refinement of the skill. Initial mistakes are 
corrected and the individual becomes less hesitant as familiarity with the task 
increases. Finally, in the Autonomous Stage, (the procedural stage in ACT*), skill 
gradually improves as a direct result of practice on the task and perfonnance 
becomes more automatic (Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977; Shiffrin & Schneider, 
1977;Speelman & Maybery, 1998). 
According to ACT* any improvement in perfonnance is a consequence of 
composition, proceduralisation and strengthening. Composition involves several 
production rules being collapsed or refined into simpler rules that achieve the same 
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goal. To illustrate the com:cpt Spcdman and Maybcry (I 1J!JX, p. XX) prc~entcd I he 
following example or live produetion rules being composed into one in I he solution 
or an algebraic equati<lll: 
IF goal is to solvt.: fOr x in the equation a"" x -1- c 
THEN set <IS sub-goal to isolate x on RHS of equation ( I ) 
IF goal is to isolate x on RHS of equation 
THEN set as sub-goal to eliminate c from RHS of equation (2) 
IF goal is to eliminate c from RHS of equation 
THEN add -c to both sides of equation (3) 
IF goal is to solve for x in the equation 
And x has been isolated on RHS of equation 
THEN LHS of equation is solution for x (4) 
After perfom1ing these production rules for the solution of the equation, composition 
will result in productions 2 and 3 being collapsed into a new production rule: 
IF 
THEN 
goal is to isolate x on RHS of equation 
add -c to both sides of equation (5) 
Further practice would result in productions I, 4 and 5 being collapsed into a single 
sophisticated production rule: 
IF 
THEN 
goal is to solve for x in equation of the fom1 a= x + c 
s!lbtract c from a and the result is the solution 
Thus the goal is achieved with only one production rule as apposed to the original 
five. The critical aspect to note here is the reduction in the number of processing 
steps results in faster processing and execution of the task but does not change the 
goal or nature of the task (Anderson, I983), 
(6) 
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Pwccdumli:;oltion rcprcs~..:nts the transition from slow (b:larativc knowll:dg~.; to faster 
automat it: procedural knowkdgc. It occurs by integrating donwin specific 
inform:Hion into gcncra! productions, thereby n!slricting the re:.dm of':.tpplication of 
the production and eliminating the need to maintain large amounts of general 
knowledge in working memory (Anderson, JIJ83). This reduction in demand on 
working memory results in an improvement in both speed and accuracy of 
pcrfonnance. 
Finally, eyery time a production is successfully applied the production gains strength, 
resulting in a higher probability that it will be utilised in fut.Jre. However, unlike 
compilation and proceduralisation, strengthening does not qualitatively change the 
productions and is associated with smaller improvements in perfonnance. Hence it is 
often associated with the flattening of the learning curve as it approaches asymptote 
(Anderson, 1983). 
Contrary to Logan's Instance Theory, ACT* predicts transfer of skills from one 
domain to another depending on the number of shared productions (Singley & 
Anderson, 1989). Thus transfer between tasks that share the same strategy should be 
high although not necessarily complete. Although Anderson (1983) has reported 
evidence in support of this view of transfer, there has been some criticism of this 
view. For example, Carlson and Schneider (1989) suggested that it is difficult to 
identify which productions are actually utilised in any particular task and that 
production models can be devised post hoc to account for any amount of transfer, 
making it virtually impossible to falsify the theory. 
"' 
Anderson (I t)87) recognises this alh.:gation and agn.:cs that it is di nic•.dt to prl!dict the 
amount oftransl'cr that will occur because participants an.: unahk to vcrhalise the 
actual productions in usc. However, empirical research has consistently supported 
tl1c prediction that transfer will occur between tasks as a function oft11c amount of 
shared procedural knowledge that exists between the tasks (Corbett & Anderson, 
1992; Greig & Speelman, J9!J9; Frcnsch, 1991; Kicrus & Bovair, 1986; Singley & 
Anderson. 1989; Speelman & Kirsncr, 1997). 
Trr.nsfer 
Skill transfer is referred to as the degree to which skills obtained in one area assist in 
the acquisition or implementation of skills in another area (Greig & Speelman, 
1999). In addition, transfer is considered to be general when the skills acquired on 
one task can be used to assist in the performance of a different task (Masson, 1986 ). 
Conversely, transfer is considered specific when skills cannot be generalised to other 
tasks (Masson, 1986). 
The ACT* and instance theories make different predictions relating to transfer. As 
mentioned previously ACT* states that transfer between tasks will occur as a 
function of the number of shared productions between the tasks. The amount of 
transfer is directly related to how applicable the production rules developed with one 
task are to the perfonnance of another task; the more closely the two tasks are related 
the greater the amount of transfer (Anderson, 1982, 1987). This is not to say that the 
tasks themselves have to be similar. Singley and Anderson ( 1989) demonstrated that 
negative and zero transfer can occur between tasks that on the surface appear to be 
alike. So it is the shared abstract components not superficial similarity oftasks that 
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dil·tatcs transfer (Anderson, I t)87; Frcnsch, llJ1) I; Rosc.;nbloom, & Nc.;wcl I, I 1JI-ifJ; 
Schneider & Fisk, JtJ84; Speelman & Kirsncr, Jt)!J7). 
I/ 
In contrast. Logan predicts that there can be no transfer between tasks because skill 
acquisition is based on past instances ofpcrforming a task. Experience of one 
situation cannot advantage the individual in a new situation because there can he no 
stored infonnation pertaining to the new situation (Logan, 1988; 1990; Rickard, 1997; 
Rickard, Healy & Bourne, 1994 ). Logan (1988) supported this position with a se•·ies 
of experiments based on both lexical decision and alphabet-arithmetic tasks. 
In the alphabet-arithmetic task participants were presented with an equation such as 
A+ 3 = D to which they were required to respond "True" or "False". Participants 
experienced one half of the alphabet in the training phase and the other half in the 
test phase. Logan found that learning from the first phase of the experiment did not 
transfer to the second phase- participants were as slow at the beginning of the 
second phase as they were at the beginning of the first phase. From this he concluded 
that skill acquisition and transfer were specific to the items experienced during 
training and that no general learning had occurred (Logan, 1988; Logan & Klapp, 
1991). 
Similar results were found in the lexical decision task where Logan presented 
participants with 10 words and 10 non-words, repeated 16 times in the training 
phase. During the transfer phase participants were shown the old items as well as I 0 
new words and 10 new non-words again repeated 16 times. Reaction times for the 
new items demonstrated a slight practice effect over blocks, but the reaction time 
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data for the old items dl'en..:ased substantially hoth ahsolutely ;_md relative to the new 
item controls. Because these RT reductions occurred f(Jr hoth words and non-words, 
Logan i nt erprt.:tcd these resu ]Is as fu rthcr evidence oft he speci lie nature or ski J J 
acq uisi I ion. 
In a study using typographically transformed words Masson ( 1980) found skill 
transfer to be highly specific and occurring only when training and test trials shared 
the same letters in the same case. The experiment involved participants reading 
words comprised of letters that had been reversed through their vertical axis and <;o 
presented as mirror in1ages of the actual letter. In the training phase of the 
experiment participants were presented with words using only 13 letters of the 
alphabet. In the test phase Masson ( 1986) presented three different conditions; words 
encountered in training, new words using old letters and new words using new 
letters. The logic behind the experiment was that if participants developed a general 
algorithm for reading mirror-reversed letters this should generalise to the new words 
and assist in the reading. If on the other hand transfer was specific to the words 
encountered during training, only those words would be recognised. Masson found 
the latter case to be true in that the ability to identify one set of words did not transfer 
to another, different set of words even if those words contained previously 
encountered letters (Masson, 1986). 
Research by Rickard (1997) using a pound arithmetic task also offers support for the 
specificity of transfer. Solving pound arithmetic problems such as 4 # 17 = ?, 
involves the execution of a simple three-step algorithm. The first step is to subtract 
the left-hand side of the equation from the right-hand side (i.e., 17-4 = 13). Second, 
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1 is alhkd to dte result of step I (i.e., l.l -!- I = 14). Fint.~lly the rcsull of stt;p 2 is 
added to the right-lwnd number (i.e., 17 -f- 14 = .ll ). The experiment involved six 
separate sessions and comprised of 15 - 21 blocks of trials. The transfer phase 
occurred immediately a Her the firth session and comprised 18 old and new problems. 
Mean RT ror the old problems were significantly different to the RT for the new 
problems, which demonstrated that learning on this task was highly specific to the 
items encountered during training. 
Lassaline and Logan ( 1993) offered further evidence in support of the specific nature 
of skill transfer with their spatial numerosity task. Spatial patterns of between 6 and 
11 items were presented to participants who were then required to judge the number 
of items in each pattern. In the training phase, reaction times increased in a linear 
relationship with the number of items in the pattern, which would suggest that 
participants were counting the items in each pattern and so were using an algorithm 
to perfom1 the task. After practicing the task with a fixed set of patterns over a 
number of days, there was no difference in response times regardless of the number 
of items in the pattern. This implies that participants had ceased counting the items 
and had remembered the number of items in each pattern and so had begun to use 
memory recall to perform the task. The transfer phase was conducted 12 days later, 
at which time participants were presented with new patterns. RT returned to the same 
level as at the beginning of training indicating that no transfer had occurred between 
the old and new patterns. 
However, Palmeri (I 997) extended the Lassaline and Logan task by including in the 
transfer phase patterns that were similar to the old patterns. So in the training phase 
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participants saw one set of patterns then in the transfer phase tln:y wcn.: prcscntcd 
with the old p1.1ttcrns. new patterns that were similar hut not identical to the old 
patterns. and patterns that were completely diiTcrcnt. The n.:sults oft he transf{:r phase 
showed that RT for the old patterns was fastest hut RT for the similar patterns were 
faster than RT fOr the new patterns. So transfer occurred in the Palmeri study but not 
in the Lassalinc and Logan study which used the same task. The results from 
Palmeri's study indicate that the specific nature of skill transfer can be infl ucnccd by 
the similarity of stored instances. It also indicates that transfer in a particular tas' an 
be influenced by the training conditions. 
Further investigation by Speelman and Kirsner (1997) using syllogistic reasoning 
indicated a more general transfer of skill from training to test situation. Participants 
were required to respond 'True' or 'False' to a series of syllogisms presented via a 
computer screen in the format: 
All artists are beekeepers 
All beekeepers are chemists 
All artists are chemists 
The first two premises were presented to participants, after which they pressed 
READY, and the premises disappeared and the conclusion appeared on the screen. 
At this stage participants had to decide whether the conclusion was 'true' or 'false1 
based on the information in the first two premises. 
Although none ofthe syllogisms were repeated, they all followed the same fonnat 
and this allowed a general solution to be applied to all problems. Speelman and 
Kirsner (1997) found that because the participants improved in their ability to solve 
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the syllogisms when there was no repetition of itl!lllS it was an indication of gc.:nt:rul 
transfer. Participants had learned the solutiontcclmiquc and applied it to all new 
syllogism.., (Speelman & Kirsncr, I 997). 
/I 
Positive transfer has nlso been shown to occur in category search tasks (Schneider & 
Fisk, 1984). During training participants were presented with lists of three words, 
one of which would be a member of a target category. For example, participants had 
to identify \vhich word from the list house, tractor and sword belonged to the 
category weapon. In the transfer phase participants were given the same categories 
but had to search for a different word (i.e., gun instead of sword). Because 
participants were easily able to identify the new word as being a member of a 
particular category it demonstrated high positive transfer had occurred. 
Other research shows that transfer can be both general and specific in the same task. 
Greig and Speelman (1999) developed an algebraic equation task x' + 2y ~with a 
range of values being substituted for x andy. In the training phase, participants were 
presented with a small set ofx, y pairs, with each pair being presented several times. 
Phase two comprised the same equation but with a different set ofx, y values each 
presented several times. The results indicated that although reaction times slowed at 
the beginning of phase two compared to the end of phase one, participants were still 
faster than in the initial stages of training, demonstrating that some benefit was 
obtained from the training. Greig and Speelman concluded that, because RT at the 
beginning of phase 2 was faster than at the beginning of phase 1, participants must 
have learned something general about the task that could be transferred to phase ~ 
when a different set ofx andy pairs were presented. However, according to Greig 
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and Speelman. the f<.Jcl that performance was slowed from the end of phase ont: to tht: 
beginning of phase two implies that the skills acquired in phase one were to some 
extent specific to the individual x, y pairs presented during phase one. 
The Relations/tip hetweC'n Task and Tramfer 
Clearly there is some discrepancy in the literature as to the nature of skill acquisition 
and its transfer. Masson ( 1986) and Logan ( 1988) both found that learning was 
highly specific and that transfer could not occur between old and nc·.v items. 
Speelman and Kirsner (1997) and Schneider and Fisk (1984) demonstrated that 
transfer was general when a new task could be solved using the same strategy as an 
old task. Additionally, transfer has also been shown to be both general and specific 
(Greig & Speelman, 1998). 
The theories proposed to account for the way in which skills are acquired is also 
contradictory in nature. Logan1s instance theory states that transfer of learning can 
only occur when an identical situation to the one involved in training is encountered, 
which highlights a fundamental flaw in the theory because other research has 
demonstrated that transfer to new items can occur (Greig & Speelman, 1998; 
Speelman & Kirsner, 1997). Both ACT* and EBRW suggest that transfer can occur 
depending on the training circumstances. All this leaves the initial question as to 
whether skills obtained in the training environment can be generalised beyond the 
classroom largely unresolved. The conflicting nature ofthe research results on the 
subject, as well as the contradictory theoretical opinions, suggests that no equivocal 
answer is possible at present. 
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There is an obvious nc~.:d li.1r clarilication of the situation to determine what 
cnmbin:~tion of circumstances during training lc:~ds to effCctiVl! transli.:r. ·1 hr.! 
conflicting evidence com pi h:d so fl1r suggests that the disparity of rl.!sults might hr.! 
due to the disparate nature of the tasks involved. Some tasks such as the syllog1srn 
task used by Speelman and Kirsncr ( 191J7) may have inherent properties that make 
transfer from one domain to another more effective. Whereas other tasks like the 
reverse reading task used by Masson ( 1986} might not contain these clements and so 
transfer is restricted to the items experienced during training. 
For example the syllogism task could be solved by identifying the common clements 
in the two premises and drawing a conclusion about the uncommon clements based 
on their position in the syllogism. Thus when the conclusion was presented, a 
decision pertaining to its accuracy could be made quickly. Based on the example 
given earlier 
All artists are beekeepers 
All beekeepers are chemists 
All artists are chemists 
the common element is 'beekeeper'. By then reading the uncommon elements (i.e., 
artist and chemist) from left to right one detennines that all artists are chemists so 
that when the conclusion is presented it is easy to respond 'true' quickly. Once this 
strategy is identified by a participant the nature and order of the content words 
becomes irrelevant, and the strategy is applicable to all syllogisms presented in this 
manner. 
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C'onvcr.sely. in the reverse reading task u.sed by Masson, learning to read the word 
C'AT prese!1ted in mirror reverse print in the training phase oftlw experiment 
represented no value to the participant who had to read PEN presented in mirror 
reverse print in the transfer phase. The two tasks share no common ground and no 
strategy could be developed that would assist in the transfi::r or learning from one 
phase to another. 
?1 
The same argument can be applied to the other tasks used to assess transfer. For 
instance, in the Schneider and Fisk ( 1984) category search task, identifying that the 
word table belongs to the category furniture when presented with the list dog, table, 
and car is not particularly onerous. So when the participant is presented with the 
word chair in the transfer phase there is no reason why the recognition that it also 
belongs to the category furniture should take any longer than in the training phase. 
Consequently it can be argued that the knowledge required to perfonn this task was 
so general as to not impede perfonnance when the items were cl1 r:nged. 
Conversely the pound alphabet task used by Rickard (1997) would require the same 
level of processing in the transfer phase as in the training phase. Although the 
solution of the equation involves the same three specific steps in both phases, each 
time the numbers were changed new calculations would be needed and so it is 
unlikely that much improvement could be made in reaction times once the algorithm 
had been mastered. Therefore it is unlikely that learning from the training phase 
could be beneficial to the participant in the transfer phase and so not such transfer 
could occur. 
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By devising an experiment that presented these tasks under unifi:Jrm administration 
conditions that allowed direst comparison of the tasks, it might he possible to 
identify whether or not trans!Cr is predicated upon inherent properties of the task 
itscl f rather than the tntining conditions per se. If transfer occurred in any of these 
tasks under controlled conditions, it should be possible to identify which properties 
in the task enabled transfer. 
Conclusion 
25 
Evidently there is a degree of conflict in the literature as to the speci fie nature of skill 
transfer and it begs the question of how can transfer be specific in some experiments 
but demonstrate general transfer in others. The answer appears to lie with the task 
itself and whether or not it contains properties that can be incorporated into a general 
solution strategy for performing the task. When a task does contain those properties, 
as in the syllogism task and the category search task, transfer is likely to be general. 
If on the other hand the task contains no such properties, as in the reverse reading 
task, the pound arithmetic task and the alphabet-arithmetic task, no general solution 
strategy can be developed and so transfer is likely to be specific to the items 
encountered during training. 
Of greater concern is the evidence obtained from the spatial numerosity task, which 
demonstrated specific transfer in the Lassaline and Logan ( 1993) experiment and 
then showed partial positive transfer in the Palmeri (1997) study. The results from 
these two experiments cast doubt over the veracity of Logan's instance theory 
because in its present form, the instance theory is unable to account for the different 
levels of transfer that occurred using the same task. 
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Logan ( 1988, 1990, 19'!2; Logan & Klapp, I 'J91) clearly and emphatically stales that 
prior learning can only be beneficial in pcr/Onning a new task when both the old and 
new tasks arc identical. The Palmeri ( 1997) study clearly i llustratcs that past 
experience can be analogous to a new situation and this presents a serious problem 
for the instance theory as there is no provision within the theory to account for 
pertbrmance on a new task benefiting from past experiences that arc similar to tnc 
new task. 
Understandably, Logan developed his theory based on the results of his own 
research. This involved experiments using the lexical decision task, the alphabet-
arithmetic task and spatial numerosity task, none of which contain properties that are 
likely to result in a general solution strategy being developed. Therefore it is not 
surprising that the experiments resulted in specific transfer. However, when the 
spatial numerosity task was presented in a format that enabled participants to benefit 
from prior exposure to the task it resulted in partial positive transfer. 
The conflicting results from the Lassaline and Logan (1993) and Palmeri (1997) 
experiments alone provide the impetus not only for more detailed investigation of the 
nature of transfer but also for the refinement of the instance theory itself. Presented 
in concert with the all the other evidence relative to the specificity of transfer, the 
only logical conclusion to be drawn is that the nature of skill transfer is a function of 
the task involved. 
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Skill Acquisition and Task .II 
The Specificity of Skill acquisition: Is it Task Related? 
Skill transf'er refers to the degree to which skills ohtained in one area assist in the 
acquisition or implementation of skills in another area (Greig & Speelman, 1999). In 
addition, transfer is considered to be general when the skills acquired on one task can 
be used to assist in the perfom1ance of a different task (Masson, 1986). Conversely, 
transfer is considered specific when skills cannot be generalised to other tasks 
(Masson, 1986). 
Research in this area has generated some conflicting results offering no clear 
understanding of whether skill acquisition and transfer are specific or general or 
both. On one side of the debate are theorists who support the 'shared elements' 
approach to transfer, who argue that when a person encounters a new situation or 
task, he/she would benefit from past experience in proportion to the number of 
similarities between the old and new situation (Anderson, 1983; Bovair, Kieras, & 
Polson, 1990; Kieras & Bovair, 1986; Rosenbloom & Newell, 1987; Singley & 
Anderson, 1989). In contrast, those arguing for the opposite view state that transfer 
occurs only when both the old and new task are identical (Compton & Logan, 1991; 
Logan & Klapp 1993; Logan, 1988, 1990, 1992; Pennington, Nicolich, & 
Rahm, 1995). 
Two modem theories of skill acquisition that characterise this dichotomy of opinions 
are Logan's Instance Theory of Learning and Anderson's Adaptive Control of 
Thought Theory (ACT*). Both theories can account for most ofthe changes that 
occur with learning and skilled behaviour, but they differ in terms ofthe specificity 
of transfer (Greig & Speelman, 1999). Logan's theory predicts that skills are specific 
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to the contexts in which they arc acquired and Anderson's ACT* Theory predicts 
both general and specific skills depending on the training conditions. 
Logan's lm>'lallce 1'lwo1:1' 
Jl 
Logan's ( 1988, 1990, 1992) Instance Theory of Automisation states that learning is 
based on exposure to specific events and that for each exposure a memory is stored. 
These memories arc called instances in this theory. The more exposure a person 
receives to a given stimulus the more instances are available for retrieval. Logan 
argues that faster reaction times (RT's) on a task are a function of the amount of 
practice with a task a person has experienced. Faster retrieval of information is a 
direct result of the increased number of instances available for retrieval rather than 
refinement of a general solution strategy. 
Logan's Instance Theory is fundamentally a memory based theory predicated upon 
three main assumptions: Firstly that encoding into memory occurs as an "obligatory, 
unavoidable consequence of attention" to a stimulus (Logan, 1988, p. 493); secondly, 
that having attended to a stimulus, retrieval from memory of anything associated 
with the stimulus is obligatory and unavoidable; and thirdly, that each individual 
encounter with a stimulus is encoded, stored and retrieved separately. 
The accumulation of separate memories, or instances, of a particular situation or 
stimulus results in a leaming mechanism whereby practice ultimately results in a 
transition from algorithmic processing to memory-based processing (Logan, 1988). 
Logan argues that each episode connected with a particular stimulus has an equal 
chance of retrieval so that every time a person perfonns a task the memory process 
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and the algorithm compete in a metaphoric 'race'; the process that produces a 
solution !irst controls the response. Rctricving an instancc is simply recalling the pust 
solution to the problem, so the 'race' is in effect between generating a solution (i.e., 
algorithm) and remembering an answer (i.e., instance). In the novice stage there arc 
fewer instances available for retrieval and so the algorithm is more likely to win. As 
the individual becomes more skilled, a greater number of instances are stored and 
this increases the probability of one of them being retrieved faster than the 
processing of the algorithm. Consequently, instance retrieval eventually dominates 
the race (Compton & Logan, 1991; Rickard, 1997). 
Due to the nature of the instance theory, Logan predicts that there can not be any 
transfer between tasks. According to Logan, skill acquisition is based on an 
accumulation of instances that are highly specific to the stimuli encountered. As a 
result, perfonnance on a new task, albeit with similar stimulus conditions, would not 
be enhanced by past learning. This implies that new problems, regardless of any 
similarity to old problems, are treated as if they are completely new (Greig & 
Speelman, 1999). 
Palmeri (1997) extended to the instance theory by allowing past experience to benefit 
current perfonnance on a task if the two tasks involved similar stimuli. In his 
exemplar-based random walk model (EBRW), Palmeri incorporates both Logan's 
instance theory and Nosofsky's (!986) generalised context model of categorisation 
(GCM). In Palmeri's EBRW model, instances are retrieved with rates proportional to 
their similarity to the current stimulus, therefore providing the flexibility needed for 
similarity between stimuli to be of benefit in performing a task. 
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Anderson:\· ACT* 1'lwo1:V 
Underlying Anderson's theory is the distinction between declarative and procedural 
knowledge. Dcclarativl.: knowledge is what an individual knows- knowledge ahout 
facts- whereas procedural knowledge is the 'how' of an action or procedure. 
Anderson states that these two types of knowledge differ fundamentally in their role 
in skill acquisition (Anderson, 1983). 
The use of declarative infonnation is slow and ponderous in that every fact relating 
to a stimulus has to be retrieved from long-term memory before it can be held in 
short tem1 memory for assessment in terms of its appropriateness to the situation. 
This declarative information is then operated on by weak problem solving processes 
such as analogy or means-end analysis. These problem solving processes are referred 
to as weak because they can be applied to a range of problems and are not tied to any 
particular problem type. This process results in the formation of production rules that 
form the basis of procedural knowledge. 
Production rules are a series of'if- then' or 'condition-action' statements such that 
when the 'if component is matched with information stored in mem('lty a particular 
outcome or action is performed -the 'then' component (Anderson, 1983). With 
practice execution of these productions becomes more efficient and therefore faster. 
Thus a general strategy for performing is developed and refined with practice on the 
task (Pirolli & Anderson, 1985). 
According to ACT* any improvement in performance is a consequence of 
composition, proceduralisation and strengthening. Composition involves several 
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production rules being collapsed or rcfmcd into simpler rules. These new rules must 
occur in sequence and share the same ultimate goal; they just achieve the result in 
fewer steps (Anderson. I 983 ). The critical aspect to note here is the reduction in 
processing steps results in lltstcr processing and execution of the task but docs not 
change the goal or nature of the task (Anderson, !983). 
Proceduralisation represents the transition from slow declarative knowledge to faster 
<tutomatic procl!dural knowledge. It occurs by integrating domain specific 
information into productions, thereby restricting the realm of application of the 
production and eliminating the need to maintain large amounts of general knowledge 
in working memory (Anderson, 1983). This reduction in demand on working 
memory results in an improvement in both speed and accuracy of perfonnance. 
Finally, every time a production is successfully applied the production gains strength 
resulting in a higher probability that it will be utilised in future. However, unlike 
compilation and proceduralisation, strengthening does not qualitatively change the 
productions and is associated with smaller improvements in performance. Hence it is 
often associated with the flattening of the learning curve as it approaches asymptote 
(Anderson, 1983). 
Contrary to Logan's Instance Theory, ACT* predicts transfer of skills from one 
domain to another depending on the nutnber of productions developed to perfom1 
one task that can be utilised in perfonning a second task (Singley & Anderson, 
1989). Thus transfer between tasks that share the same strategy should be high 
although not necessarily complete. Although Anderson ( 1982, 1987) has reported 
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evidence in support of this view oftnmsfer, there has been some criticism of' this 
view. For example, Carlson and Schneider (I 989) suggested that it is difficult to 
identify which productions nrc actually utilised in any particular task and that 
production models can be devised post hoc to account for any amount oftransfer, 
making it virtually impossible to falsify the theory. 
JG 
Anderson (1987) recognises this criticism and agrees that it is difficult to predict the 
amount of transfer that will occur because participants are unable to verbalise the 
actual productions in use. However, empirical research has consistently supported 
the prediction that transfer will occur between tasks as a function of the amount of 
shared procedural knowledge necessary to perform the task (Corbett & Anderson, 
1992; Greig & Speelman, 1999; Frensch, 1991; Kieras & Bovair, 1986; Singley & 
Anderson, 1989; Speelman & Kirsner, 1997). 
Transfer 
The ACT* and instance theories make different predictions relating to transfer. As 
mentioned previously, ACT* states that transfer between tasks will occur as a 
function of the number of shared productions between the tasks. The amount of 
transfer is directly related to how applicable the production rules developed with one 
task are to the performance of another task; the more closely the two tasks are related 
the greater the amount oftransfer (Anderson, 1982, 1987). This is not to say that the 
similarity of tasks is all that determines transfer. Singley and Anderson ( 1989) 
demonstrated that negative and zero transfer could occur between tasks that on the 
surface appear to be alike. So it is the shared components not superficial similarity of 
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tasks that dictates transrer (Anderson, I 987; Frcnsch, IIJIJ I; Ncwcll & Rosenbloom, 
198(1; Speelman & Kirsncr. I 997). 
In contrast, Logan predicts that there can be no transfer between tasks <.IS skill 
acquisition is bused on past instances of performing a task. Experience of one 
situation cannot advantage the individual in a new situation because there can be no 
stored infomuttion pertaining to the new situation (Logan, 1988; 1990). Logan 
( 1988) supported this position with a series of experiments based on both lexical 
decision and alphabet-arithmetic tasks. In the alphabet-arithmetic experiments 
participants were presented with an equation such as A+ 3 c: D to which they were 
required to respond "Tme" or "False". Participants experienced one half of the 
alphabet in the training phase and the other half in the test phase. Logan found that 
learning from phase one did not transfer to phase two of the experiment- participants 
were as slow at the beginning of the second phase as they were at the beginning of 
the first phase. From this he concluded that skill acquisition and transfer were 
specific to the items experienced during training and that no general learning had 
occurred (Logan, 1988; Logan & Klapp, 1991 ). 
In a different study using typographically transformed words, Masson ( 1986) found 
skill transfer to be highly specific, occurring only when training and test trials shared 
the same specific features. The experiment involved participants reading words 
comprised of letters that had been reversed through their vertical axis and so 
presented as mirror images of the actual letter. In the training first phase of the 
experiment participants were presented with words using only 13 letters of the 
alphabet. In the test phase Masson presented three different conditions; words 
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encountered in training, new words using old letters and new words using new 
letters. 
The logic behind Masson's experiment was that if participants developed a general 
algorithm for reading mirror~rcversed letters this should generalise to the new words 
and assist in the reading. If on the other hand tra:-~sf'cr was specific to the words 
encountered during training, only those words encountered during training would be 
recognised. Masson found that the ability to identify one set of words did not transfer 
to another, different set of words even if those words contained previously 
encountered letters (Masson, 1986). 
Further investigation by Speelman and Kirsner (1997) using syllogistic reasoning 
indicated a more general transfer of skill from training to test situation. Participants 
were required to solve a series of syllogisms. Although none of the syllogisms were 
repeated, they all possessed the same structure and this allowed a general solution to 
be applied to all problems. Speelman and Kirsner (1997) found that because the 
participants improved in their ability to solve the syllogisms when there was no 
repetition of items it was an indication of general transfer. Participants had learned 
the solution technique and applied it to all new syllogisms (Speelman & Kirsner, 
1997). 
Other research shows that transfer can be both general and specific in the same task. 
Greig and Speelman (1999) developed an algebraic equation task .r
2 
+ 
2
.1' = A 
2 
with 
a range of values being substituted for x andy. In the training phase, participants 
were presented with a small set of x and y pairs with each pair being presented 
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several times. Phase two comprised the same equation hut with a dif/i.;rent set of' x 
andy values each presented several times. The results indicated that although 
reaction times slowed at the beginning of phase two compared to the end of phase 
one, participants were still faster than in the initial stages of training demonstrating 
that some bcne!it was obtained from the training. Greig and Speelman concluded 
that, because RT at the beginning of phase two was faster than at the beginning of 
phase I. participants must have learned something general about the task that could 
be transferred to phase 2 when a different set ofx andy pairs were presented. 
However, according to Greig and Speelman, the fact that perfonnancc was slowed 
from the end of phase one to the beginning of phase two implies that the skills 
acquired in phase one were to some extent specific to the individual x andy pairs 
presented during phase one. 
The Present Study 
Clearly there is some discrepancy in the literature as to the nature of skill acquisition 
and its transfer. Masson ( 1986) and Logan ( 1988) both found that leaming was 
highly specific and that transfer could not occur between old and new items. 
Speelman and Kirsner (1997) demonstrated that transfer was general when a new 
task could be solved using the same strategy as in an old task. Additionally, Greig & 
Speelman (1998) showed that transfer could be both general and specific. 
The hypothesis under test in the present study was that conflicting evidence 
regarding the specificity of skills is task related. That is, the task itsclfprcdicts the 
amount of learning (skill acquisition) and therefore the amount of transfer that 
occurs. Those tasks that result in specific skill transfer do so because they are 
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inherently specific; that is, there arc no li::atures in the task that can he incorporatt:d 
into a general perrormancc strategy and so no such strategy can he developed that 
could l'acilitatc transfer to another version of the task. Conversely a task that 
demonstrates general transll:r docs so because it contains properties that can he 
10 
use rut when used to perform a different version of the task. Each of the four tasks 
highlighted above differs in its ability to develop general skills. The Masson reversed 
word task involves people learning to read words with the letters presented in mirror 
reversed fonn. It is unlikely that exposure to the letter C presented backwards in the 
training phase can assist the participant when he/she is presented with the letter F 
presented backwards in the transfer phase. Thus no general strategy is likely to be 
developed that can transfer from one phase to the next. 
The same appears to be true for the alphabet-arithmetic task used in the Logan 
experiments. Being presented with A + 3 = D during training if unlikely to provide 
any benefit when it comes to solving G + 4 =Kin the transfer phase. These two 
problems, for example, involve different regions of the alphabet, and so counting 
through the alphabet to solve each problem would not involve any of the same 
letters. The only element that the two problems share is counting and it is likely that 
for most of the participants in Logan's study, the ability to count was already at the 
optimal level. Thus there appears little that one could learn about this task with one 
set of! etters that could transfer to perfonning the same task with a different set of 
letters. 
In contrast the syllogism task developed by Speelman and Kirsncr ( 1997) 
demonstrated general transfer because all the syllogisms could be solved using the 
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same strategy, thus making the content and format of the syllogisms irrclcv<Jn! in 
terms oft he participants ability to solve them. In the Greig and Speelman algebra 
task transrer was shown to he both general and specific. Purticipants were uhlc to 
learn the steps involved in solving the equation in phase one and transfCr that 
knowledge across to phase two because the format of the equation remained constant 
throughout the equation. However, because the values for x andy changed in the 
second phase. no learning in tem1s of the actual x- y pairs from phase one could be 
transferred to phase two. Thus transfer in tenns of the x- y pairs was specific and 
transfer in tenus of the equation was general. 
The aim of the present study was to test the two predictions; (1) that if learning 
occurred in the absence of repeated items it should predict transfer in the task from 
one set of items to another and; (2) the nature of the task will detem1ine the 
specificity of that transfer. If learning occurs without repetition of items, this would 
suggest that participants do not rely on memory for past solutions, but instead use an 
algorithm to perfonn the task. That is, in the early stages of performance, when RT is 
slower, participants develop a strategy to perfom1 the task. With practice on the task 
the algorithm is refined so that performance is faster and more efficient. 
If learning occurs under these conditions it would be logical to assume that when 
participants are presented with a different version of the task that the likelihood of 
transfer occurring would be dictated by the efficiency of the algorithm. The 
specificity ofthe transfer would depend on the obility of the strategy to generalise to 
a different item set. Ifthe task londs itself to a general solution strategy, that strategy 
should apply when different items are presented within the framework oft he same 
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task. Irthc task generates a strategy that is dependent upon the specific items being 
presented, then the strategy will not generalise to the new items and transfer would 
not occur. 
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To test these assumptions the experiment was divided into three phases and the four 
tasks highlighted earlier were all compared directly. Phase one of the experiment was 
designed to examine the amount of learning that occurred in the absence of repeated 
items. If learning occurred during this phase it would indicate the development of an 
algorithm that could be used to perfonn the task regardless of the actual items 
presented and therefore should predict the amount of transfer that occurred in the 
transfer phase. Based on the evidence of past research that showed the syllogism task 
demonstrated the highest degree of transfer it was predicted that the syllogism task 
would demonstrate the most learning in phase one. With the exception of the 
syllvgism task none of the other tasks had previously been presented using no 
repetition of items so there was no precedent for anticipating the amount of learning 
that would occur in each tasks under these conditions. However, based on the amount 
of transfer that had occurred with the tasks in previous research it was predicted that 
the algebra task would show the second highest learning rate followed by the 
alphabet-arithmetic task and the reverse reading task. 
In the training and transfer phases {phases 2 & 3) participants encountered a different 
task to the one in which they were involved in phase 1. These phases each comprised 
10 items repeated ten times making 100 items in total, with different items in each 
phase. This aspect ofthe study largely replicated previous experiments using these 
tasks with the exception of the syllogism task. In the previous studies, the algebra, 
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alphabet-arithmetic and reverse reading tasks were all presented to participants as a 
small set of items repeated a number of times. In the original syllogisms task no 
items were repeated during the training or transfer phases. In the present study in 
onlcr to maintainunif'ormmcthodology across the tasks the syllogism task was 
presented in an identical format to the other three tasks; namely 1 ()items repeated ten 
times. 
The design of this experiment allowed a direct comparison of the amount of transfer 
that occurred across the different tasks. It also enabled examination of the 
relationship to be made between the pattern of transfer and the pattern of learning 
that occurred in phase one. The hypothesis under test in this experiment predicts that 
the more learning that occurred in a particular task in phase one, the greater will be 
the degree of transfer on that task between phases two and three. Based on the results 
of previous research using these tasks, it was predicted that the syllogism task would 
demonstrate general transfer, the algebra task would show general and specific 
transfer and both the alphabet-arithmetic and reverse words tasks would result in 
zero transfer. 
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Method 
Design 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of lOur groups with each group 
comprising 15 people. Each group received training in phase I on one of the four 
tasks (i.e., syllogistic reasoning; alphabet -arithmetic; algebraic equation; mirror 
reverse words). 
Following phase I each group was further sub-divided into three, making 12 sub-
groups in total, each comprising 5 participants. Each sub-group experienced two 
more phases (phases 2 & 3) where they performed a different task to the one 
encountered in phase 1. 
Participants 
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Volunteers were recruited from the Edith Cowan University School of Psychology's 
research participant's register. A total of74 individuals were tested. However, 14 
failed to meet the perfonnance criterion of80% accuracy in one or more of the 
phases and were omitted from the analysis. The remaining 60 participants comprised 
46 females aged 17 - 62 years (mean age~ 29.22 years) and 14 males aged 17 - 52 
years (mean age= 28.14 years). Participants were randomly assigned to groups. 
Prior to the commencement of testing each participant was given a written 
explanation of the study which gave sufficient information pertaining to the study to 
ensure informed consent without explaining the expected outcomes (See Appendix 
A). 
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Materials 
Three Apple Macintosh GJ computers running Supcrlah soflwurc were used fOr 
stimulus presentation and response recording. 
Proccdttrc 
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General instructions and procedures were the same for all four tasks. Only the 
instmctions pertaining to the solution of the individual problems differed. The basic 
fom1at of the exercise was explained to each participant verbally. They were told that 
a problem would appear on the screen that they were required to solve mentally. 
When they knew the answer they were to press the spacebar, which would cause the 
problem to disappear and bring a stimulus on to the screen. The participant then had 
to decide whether the stimulus was 'TRUE' or 'FALSE' for that particular problem. 
For a 'TRUE' response participants were to press the 'Z' button on the keyboard, and 
for 'FALSE' they had to press the 'X' button. After the participant had made a 
response, feedback was given in the form of a statement appearing on the screen 
saying either 'CORRECT' or 'INCORRECT'. 
Written instructions reminding the participants which buttons to press were provided 
and left with the participant. In addition the 'Z' button on the computer keyboard was 
covered with a green sticker marked 'TRUE' and the 'X' button was covered with a 
red sticker marked 'FALSE' as a visual reminder of which keys to use. Participants 
were told to work as quickly as they could without sacrificing accuracy. 
Once the general procedure for all the tasks was explained, two practice items were 
presented in order to illustrate the specific task undertaken in phase I. Following 
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these practice ite111s a message appeared on the screen saying "Pn:ss spacebar to start 
experiment" :.11 which stage the participant was given the option of continuing with 
the experiment or repeating the practice items. Similar practice items were also 
presented at the beginning ofphasc 2, hut not at the beginning ofrhasc 3 (Sec 
Appendix B). 
Each phase took approximately 20 minutes so that each participant spent one hour on 
the computer. They were told that they could rest between phases but not to stop in 
the middle of a phase. At the end of the session participants were debriefed and 
thanked. 
Syllogism Task. The syllogism task involved participants solving syllogisms 
such as: 
All artists are beekeepers 
All beekeepers are chemh'ts 
All artists are chemists 
} premises 
conclusion 
A typical trial started with the presentation of the two premises. When the spacebar 
was pressed the first two premises disappeared and a conclusion appeared. At this 
stage the participant had to decide if the conclusion was correct based on the 
infonnation contained in the premises. For instance, in the above example the 
conclusion is correct and the appropriate response would be 'TRUEn. False 
conclusions were also presented. In the above example, a conclusion that would have 
required a "FALSE" response would be "All chemists arc artists". 
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The Phase I version oft he syllogism task comprised 80 trials with no repetition of 
items or content words. That is, no syllogism appeared more than once and none of 
the key words (e.g., beekeepers, chemists, artists, etc.) were repeated. The Phase 2 
version had 100 trials with 50 having a "TRUE" conclusion (e.g., All artists arc 
chemists) and 50 having a "FALSE" conclusion (e.g., All chemists arc artists). 
In phase 2 one set of syllogisms was presented that was repeated ten times. Of these 
syllogisms five were presented as in the order presented earlier. This syllogism has 
an ABBC order, which refers to the ordering of the elements within the premises 
(i.e., A for artist, B for beekeeper, and C for chemist). The remaining five syllogisms 
were presented in a BCAB order which is similar to the previous example but with 
the premises presented in reverse order, for example: 
All beekeepers are chemists 
All artists are beekeepers 
All artists are chemists 
Note that the ABBC and the BCAB syllogisms have the same 'TRUE' conclusion. 
The "FALSE" trials differed only in that the conclusion was the converse of the 
TRUE' conclusion and hence incorrect (e.g., all chemists are artists). Phase 3 
followed the same format as phase 2 except a completely different set of syllogisms 
was used. 
Alphabet- Arithmetic Task~ In the alphabet-arithmetic task participants were 
required to judge statements such as A + 3 == D as "TRUE" or "FALSE". The lt:ttcr 
"A" was to be considered a starting point in the alphabet and the number "3" denoted 
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the number of letters IOrward in the alphabet from this point that the solution (i .c., 
the letter D) was supposed to occur. In this example the appropriate response is 
"TRUE". In the "F ALSE 11 trials the solution letter was either one letter more or one 
letter less than the correct one. In respect to the previous example, false stimuli 
would be A + 3 ~ C or A + 3 ~ E. 
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In the Phase 1 version of the alphabet-arithmetic task, participants experienced 80 
trials with no repetition of number-letter association. Letters from the entire alphabet 
and numbers 1 to 5 were used in the stimuli. For example if'A + 3' was presented it 
would not have been repeated. Instead the letter 'A' would be paired with a different 
number (e.g., A+ 5). In addition if the "TRUE" version of a number-letter pair was 
presented, (e.g., A+ 3 ~D) the "FALSE" version (i.e., A+ 3 ~Cor E) was not, and 
vtce-versa. 
In a typical trial, participants were presented with a statement such as A + 3 = ? on 
the screen. After the spacebar was pressed the equation disappeared and a solution 
appeared on the screen. If the problem was A+ 3 =?,then a "TRUE" answer would 
beD and a "FALSE" answer would be either C or E. The participant was required to 
compare the presented answer with the solution they had generated and respond to 
"TRUE" or "FALSE" by pressing the appropriate key on the keyboard. 
The Phase 2 version of the task involved 100 trials with 50 being "TRUE" and 50 
being "FALSE11 • The "TRUE" condition presented 10 letters (i.e., A-J) always paired 
with the same number (2-5). So the letters A, E, and I were always paired with the 
number 2; B F and J were paired with 3; C and G were paired with 4; and D and H 
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were paired with 5. The "PALSE 11 trials had the same restrictions as the "TRUEu 
trials but comprised 25 items where the presented value was one more than the 
correct value (e.g .. B + 4 =G) and 25 items where the presented value was one: less 
than the correct value (e.g., B + 4 =E). Thus the I 00 trials consisted of' the I 0 letter-
number pairs repeated I 0 times. Phase 3 involved I 00 trials under identical 
conditions to phase 2 hut used a different set of letters (e.g.,K-T). 
Algebra Task. The algebra task involved participants solving the equation 
2 
x - y = A with supplied values for the x andy parameters. For example with X= 5 
2 
andY= 9 the equation becomes (25- 9) + 2 = 9. On a typical trial, the equation was 
presented in the centre of the screen with the values for x andy presented below the 
equation. Participants were required to calculate a value for 'Nand to press the 
spacebar when this was completed. When the spacebar was pressed the equation and 
x- y values disappeared and a value for 'A' was presented. For the "TRUE" trials the 
value for A was correct. In the example above A= 8. For the "FALSE" trials the 
value for 'A' that was presented was either one more or one less than the correct 
response (i.e., in the above example A= 9 or A= 7). 
The Phase I version of the task comprised 58 trials, which involved repetition of 
individual values for x andy but not x - y pairings. So a participant saw X = 5 and Y 
= 9 in only one trial, but would see X= 5 andY= 7 in another trial. In the phase 2 
version of the task there were 100 trials comprising 10 specific x- y pairings (See 
Appendix B for specific x andy values). Each of these x-y pairs were repeated I 0 
times in random order, in addition, if the "TRUE" version of a specific x- y pair was 
presented the "FALSE" version of that x- y pair was not and vice versa. Of the I 00 
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trials 50 required a "TRUE" response (5 in each hlock of I 0 trials). That is, the 
presented value for A was correct (e.g., A= 8). The remaining 50 trials were 
"FALSE" trials (5 in each block of 10 trials). where the presented value for A was 
either one more (25 trials) or one less (25 trials) than the correct value (e.g., A= 9 or 
A= 7). The Phase 3 version of the task was similar to the phase 2 version but 
different values for x andy were used. 
1\firror Reversed Reading Task. In the mirror reversed reading task 
participants were presented with words, which were in correct letter order but each 
letter appeared in mirror reversed form (reversed through the vertical axis). On each 
trial participants were required to read the word and be prepared to make a rhyming 
judgement about the word. When they were ready to make this judgement the 
participants pressed the spacebar on the keyboard causing the original word to be 
replaced by another word in normal type font. 
The Phase I version of the task was comprised of 80 trials with no repetition of 
words. Trials consisted of four to seven letter words using all letters and both upper 
and lower cases. In the phase 2 and phase 3 versions the alphabet was divided into 
two groups, duplicating the division made by Masson (1986), who reported four 
experiments, all of which used the san1e division of letters. The Phase 2 version was 
comprised of I 00 trials with words constructed from the letters ABDGIJKNQS with 
no repetition of words. The phase 3 version was similar but the letters 
CEFHLMOPRTWYZ were used. All three task versions contained equal numbers of 
both "TRUE" (i.e., word pairs did rhyme) and "FALSE" (i.e., word pairs did not 
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rhyme) trials. Although there was no n:pctition or stimulus words in this task then.: 
obviously needed to he repetition oflettcrs. 
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Results 
Median scores for each block often trials were calculated for each participant fbr all 
tasks. In phase I of the experiment the focus was on the amount oflcarning that 
occurred in the absence of repeated items. A measure of the amount of learning that 
occutTcd in phase one was calculated in terms of a percentage rate (i.e., (block I 
mean- block 8 mean)-:- block I mean x I 00) for each task. An additional percentage 
was calculated to detennine the amount of learning that occurred in each block by 
dividing the overall learning rate by the number of blocks of trials in each task. 
Descriptive statistics, along with the percentage learning rate by block and the 
overall percentage leaming rate by task are presented in Table 1. A one-way analysis 
of variance (ANOVA) was also conducted to compare learning rates between the 
tasks. 
In phases 2 and 3 of the experiment the emphasis was on whether any transfer 
occurred and, if so, to what degree. To identify whether transfer occurred in a 
particular task, at test was conducted to compare the mean RT for block 1 of phase 2 
with the mean RT for block one of phase 3. Any differences between these mean 
RT's for each task were converted to pen:.~ntage transfer values (i.e., (block 1 phase 2 
-block I phase 3) +block phase 2 x 100). A comparison of the extent of transfer that 
occurred in each task needed to take into account the different nature of the tasks. 
Thus it was important to interpret the amount of transfer that occurred on a particular 
task between phases 2 and 3 in tenns of the amount of learning that occurred on that 
task in phase 2. In this way individual differences in degree of difficulty between the 
tasks would be equated and a comparison of the amount transfer that occurred in 
each task could be made. To achieve this a savings measure was used that calculated 
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the amount of time saved in phase 3 due to the learning that occurred in phase 2. This 
entailed identifying where in phase 3 participants regained the RT speed that they 
had at the end of phase 2 (e.g., (total number ofhloeks in phase 3- phase 3 block at 
which phase 2 trial RT achieved)+ total number of blocks in phase 3 x I 00). A 
further t test was conducted to assess the amount of slowing in RT between the start 
of phase 3 and the end of phase 2 (i.e., block 10 phase 2 and block I phase 3). An 
ANOV A was also conducted using the percentage measures to compare transfer 
between tasks. 
Table I. Descriptive Statistics by Task. Percentage Learning by Block and Overall Learning Rate By 
Task for Phase I Data. 
Task 
Syllogism 
%Learning (total 
%Learning (block 
Alphabet-Arithmetic 
%Learning (total) 
%Learning (block 
Algebra 
%Learning (total) 
%Learning (block) 
Reverse Reading 
%Learning (total) 
%Learning (block) 
Block 
I 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
I 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
I 
2 
J 
4 
5 
6 
t 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
Mean (ms) SD (ms) 
!0657 7747 
9441 8061 
8922 10710 
5447 3444 
3977 1958 
3645 2185 
4085 2235 
4169 2463 
61% 
7.6% 
5078 1365 
4302 1310 
4008 1200 
4068 1937 
3657 1334 
4035 2123 
3291 1447 
33 !9 1002 
35% 
4.3% 
11201 4117 
7446 3924 
9666 2763 
9164 3316 
8952 2856 
8571 3564 
24% 
3.9% 
2729 1804 
1875 848 
1754 66 7 
2375 3029 
1624 676 
1782 1015 
1486 612 
1432 74J 
48% 
5.9% 
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Phase I 
The focus of phase one of the study was to assess the amount of learning that 
occurred in the absence of repeated items. The results inUicatcd that the greatest 
amount orlcarning occurred in the syllogism task where participants exhibited an 
overall learning rate of 61 11:, and a learning rate per block of7.61%. This was followed 
by the reverse reading task with an overall learning rate of 48%, and a learning rate 
per block of 5.9%. The alphabet~arithmctic task showed a learning rate of 35% 
overall and 4.3% by block, with the algebra task demonstrating the least amount of 
learning with an overall learning rate of24% and a per block rate of 3.91%. The 
differences in learning rate per block, however, w~re not significant !:(56)= .176, 12 = 
.912. 
Because learning occurred when no items were repeated during this phase of th'3 
experiment, the results suggest that pm1icipants were able to develop a strategy to 
perform the tasks. Due to the lack of significant difference between the learning rates 
of each task caution should be exercised in drawing conclusions from these results. 
However, the results suggest a trend that implies the effectiveness of the strategies 
developed by participants, varied between the tasks as illustrated by the different 
learning rates. These results also call into question Logan's ( 1988) assertion that 
learning can only occur when items are repeated. 
Phase2 and 3 
Transfer occurred in the syllogism and algebra tasks because perfonnance was faster 
in block 1 phase 3 than in block l phase 2 (syllogism task: !(14) = 2.262, R = .040; 
algebra task !(14) = 5.551, Jl = .000). The comparative measure of transfer indicated 
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that in the syllogism task there was 48.41Yh oftransfl:r hctwccn tlw two phases and in 
the algebra task there was JS%1 transfer. The alphabet- arithmetic task demonstrated 
transfer hut it was only 8.21XJ and the t test was not signi licant t( 14) == I .l ()3, n -"' 
.264. There was zero transfer in the reverse reading task!( 14) = -1.913, n = .076, tile 
percentage of transfer was -15%,. The pattern of transfer in this phase of the study 
from most to least was syllogism, algebra, alphabet-arithmetic and reverse reading. 
This pattem was not predicted by the pattcm of learning from phase one but it was 
predicted by previous research using these tasks. Mean RT for each block of trials in 
phase 2 and 3 is shown in Figure 1. 
14000 
Phase 2 Phase 3 
12000 
10000 
algebr:~ 
~ 8000 
e 
B syllogism 
~ 
~ 6000 alpha-:~rith 
4000 6 rev-read 
2000 
0 
0 5 10 15 20 
Block 
Figure 1. Mean training and tmnsfer reaction times by t:~sk 
There was a significant effect for the slowing ofRT between the end of phase 2 and 
the beginning of phase 3 in all four tasks. For the syllogism task!( I 4) = -2.844, 11 = 
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.013 .; alplmhct-arithmct ic task !(\4) ~ 3 .214, 11 ~ .Oilf>; the algebra task !( 14) ~ -
2.316.n = .036; :md the reverse reading task!( 14) = -5.6(J6, n = .000. In the case of' 
the reverse reading task RT at the beginning of phase 3 was slower than the 
beginning of phase 2 indicating that performance on this task was worse at the 
beginning of phase 3 than at the beginning ofrhase 2. 
In tenns of the savings measure to assess how quickly particirants were able to 
regain their phase 2 RT the algebra task demonstrated the most rapid return to pre-
transfer RT. Participants achieved their pre-transfer RT by block 3 resulting in 70% 
savings on this task. The algebra task was followed by the reverse reading task with 
participants regaining phase 2 RT by block 4 of phase 3, thus resulting in 60% 
savings. In the syllogism task participants regained their pre-transfer RT by block 6 
which indicated 40% savings and in the alphabet-arithmetic task participants 
regained their phase 2 RT speed by block 7 phase 3 resulting in 30% savings. 
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Discussion 
The results failed to support the hypothesis that the amount of learning that occurred 
in phase I would predict the amount of transfer between phase 2 and 3, although this 
could be the result of the design of the study rather than the hypothesis being 
incorrect. The second hypothesis; that the type of transfer is directly related to the 
task involved, was supported by the results of this study as indicated by the different 
types of transfer observed in the different tasks. 
As stated earlier, the results from phase one of this study failed to reach significance; 
statistically there was no difference between the learning rates of the different tasks. 
Therefore it would be incorrect to attach too great an importance to the trend of 
learning in the tasks, and any discussion of this phase must be conducted in the 
context of there being no significant difference between the tasks. Having said that 
there are some interesting issues to arise from this phase of the experiment. 
On face value, the phase one data suggested a trend ofleaming in the order of-
syllogism task, reverse reading task, alphabet-arithmetic task, and algebra task with 
the syllogism task demonstrating the most learning and the algebra task the least. 
This pattern was unexpected because, based on the evidence of past research, it was 
expected that the reverse reading task would have shown the least amount of learning 
and the algebra task would have been second highest after the syllogism task. 
One possible explanation for this result is that in the original algebra experiment 
Greig and Speelman (1998) used a small set ofx, y values, which were repeated 
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several times in the training phase. In performing the task in thi~ way, participant:-; 
were likely to have refined a strategy fOr pcrfbrrning the tusk hut also dcveloped 
memories of the spcci lie x - y pairs. This suggests that perfOrmance in the original 
experiment was a combination of relined strategy and efficient memory recall. In the 
present study, participants were presented with 80 items with no repetition of specific 
x, y pairs, so pcrfonnancc was based solely on the development and refinement of a 
strategy. 
The results of the present study indicate that it took participants some considerable 
time to develop an effective strategy to perfonn the algebra task and this resulted in a 
learning rate of only 24%. It also suggests that the absence of repeated items 
encourages the development of an algorithm to perfonn a task, whereas the repetition 
of items encourages the use of memory. 
In tenns of the learning rate in the reverse reading task, this could also be accounted 
for by the design of the study. Although there was no repetition of words in this 
phase of the study, there are only 26 letters in the alphabet, consequently there has to 
be repetition of letters. It is possible that over the course of the 80 items, participants 
became adept at recognising the shape of the individual letters and so were able to 
read the reversed word quite easily by the end of this phase. 
Conceivably it could be argued that it was the design of the study that resulted in the 
phase one learning rate failing to predict the transfer in phases two and three rather 
than the hypothesis being incorrect. Ifthe study was replicated using tasks where 
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there was no repetition at all, using a much larger sample size, it might be possible to 
draw a definite conclusion regarding this issue. 
The amount oflcarning that occurred in phase I, in the absence of repeated items 
cannot he accounted for by Logan's theory in its present form. Because there was no 
repetition of items no instances could be retrieved, which in tcnns of the instance 
theory means there should be no learning. Logan stipulates that instances arc stored 
individually every time a stimulus is encountered, and that those instances are highly 
specific to the stimulus. However, if the instances were allowed to be more abstract 
they might be applied to situations where similarities between stimuli exist, in this 
way the theory could account for learning in the absence of repeated items (Rickard, 
1997; Speelman & Kirsner, 1997). 
It was this assumption that fom1ed the basis for Palmeri's (1997) EBRW theory of 
learning, which states that the specific nature of transfer can be influenced by the 
similarity of examples in memory. According to EBRW, memory exemplars are 
retrieved in proportion to their similarity to the stimulus presented. In this way items 
that are similar, but not identical, to the current stimulus could be of benefit in a new 
version of an old task. This is similar to the propositional theory introduced by 
Logan and Etherton (1994) that holds instances to be propositions that are capable of 
expressing similarities between instances. lfthe instance theory were to be modified 
in this way it would be able to account for the level of! earning that occurred in phase 
one of the present study when no items were repeated. 
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However, the improvement in performance witnessed in phase one of the exrerinwnt 
can be accounted for by ACT*. It is evident that purticipants were a hie to develop a 
strategy to perform the various tasks and the refinement and strengthening of the 
productions used in the perfcnnance of the tasks led to the improvement in RT 
(Anderson, 1983, 1987, 1993; Speelman & Kirsner, 1997). That some tasks 
demonstrated more learning than others did implies that some tasks were better able 
to generate a solution strategy than others. 
The pattem of results pertaining to the amount of transfer that occurred in phases two 
and three supports previous research using these tasks. Both the syllogism and 
algebra tasks demonstrated partial positive transfer, albeit to different Ie.-els. The 
alphabet-arithmetic task showed some transfer but not to a statistically significant 
level and therefore is considered to be zero. The reverse reading task also showed 
zero transfer but in this case RT at the start of phase 3 was slower than at the start of 
phase 2, indicating that performance at the start of the transfer phase was worse than 
at the start of the training phase. 
Although the syllogism task demonstrated transfer it was not complete transfer as 
demonstrated by Speelman and Kirsner (1997). Again this result could be an artefact 
of the design of the present study. In the original Speelman and Kirsner experiment 
there was no repetition of any syllogisms in either the training or transfer phases. 
Whereas in the present study ten syllogisms, each repeated ten times, were presented 
in the training and transfer phases. This suggests that the different levels of transfer 
that occurred in the two studies can be accounted for by the different training and 
transfer conditions. 
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The Speelman and Kirsner results suggest that due to the lack of' n.:pctition, 
participants developed an algorithm fOr solving the syllogisms and this was 
transferred effectively from the training phase to the transfer phase of the study. In 
contrast. the repetition of syllogisms in this study indicates that although participants 
developed an algorithm in the !mining phase and transferred it to the transfer phase, 
they <1lso relied on their memory of the correct conclusion to specific syllogisms. 
Because new syllogisms were presented in the transfer phase tbose memories would 
not have benefited the participant in the transfer phase. Therefore, general learning 
from the training phase (i.e., the algorithm) was beneficial in the transfer phase, but 
the specific learning (i.e., the correct conclusion to specific syllogisms) was not 
beneficial in the transfer phase. Consequently, RT slowed significantly at the start of 
phase three compared to the end of phase two, but was not as slow as at the 
beginning of training. 
This pattern of results was also found in the algebra task and supports the previous 
research by Greig and Speelman (1998) who found transfer can be both general and 
specific within the same task. It also supports the suggestion made previously that 
the repetition of specific items encourages participants to use memory based retrieval 
to perform the task, whereas lack of repetition forces them to develop and refine an 
algorithm. 
The lack of transfer observed in the alphabet-arithmetic task again supports previous 
research using the task where transfer was found to be highly specific to items 
experienced during training (Logan, 1988; Logan & Klapp, 1991; Klapp, Boches, 
Trabert & Logan, 1991). The results obviously support the instance theory that no 
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transfer would occur due to there being no stored instances of the new stimulus 
items. However it can also be accounted fOr by the ACT*, in that although hoth 
phase 2 and 3 involved the same task, the solution strategy utilised in phase 2 was 
not generalisable to the items encountered in phase J. 
62 
In his original experiment, Logan (1988) remarked that participants reported their 
strategy as~ saying the alphabet to themselves until the target letter was reached and 
then incorporating the digit addend to arrive at an answer, participants in the present 
study reported using this same strategy. Naturally if this strategy was applied to the 
second phase of the study, which utilised letters from the latter half of the alphabet 
RT is bound to be slower as it would take longer to reach the target letter. 
This illustrates Carlson and Schneider's ( 1989) criticism of ACT* in that it can be 
made to account for any level of transfer that occurs. Anderson ( 1983) counters this 
argument by stating that rather than the theory being manipulated to account for 
varying amounts of transfer, it is an example of participants adherence to an 
inefficient strategy. During the training phase, participants were able to develop a 
solution strategy to perfonn the task, and because it had proved effective, continued 
to use the same strategy in the transfer phase. However, because the transfer phase 
comprised letters from the latter half of the alphabet, the strategy took longer to 
arrive at an answer and by definition resulted in slower reaction times. Therefore, 
slower RT was a product of inefficient strategy selection rather than the lack of 
shared components. 
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It would be interesting to test this ussumption by modifYing the experiment slightly. 
Instead of simply dividing the alphabet in half A - J :.md K - T as Logun did, the 
division should he a combination ofhoth early and late letters similar to the division 
made by Masson (1986) in the reverse words experiment. This would remove the 
confound of the time taken to reach the target Jetter in phase 3 and allow a more 
balanced comparison of the two phases to detennine if transfer is affected by the 
confound. 
The fourth task, reverse words showed zero transfer to the degree that RT was slower 
at the start of phase 3 than it had been at the beginning of phase 2. This implies that 
participants developed a solution strategy that applied only to the items experienced 
in phase 2 of the study. When they were presented with new items in phase 3, that 
strategy was not effective and consequently RT's were significantly slower than at 
the start of phase 2 and indicates that learning from phase 2 could not be applied to 
the new situation. Intuitively this result makes sense in that, learning to read the 
letters CAT backwards would not share any elements with leaming to read the letters 
PEN backwards; therefore it is not surprising that participants were unable to 
develop a general learning strategy to solve the new problems. 
The fact that participants were slower at the start of phase 3 than they were at tl1e 
beginning of phase 2 raises the issue of what Anderson (1995) called negative 
transfer. Anderson (1995) states that only one example of negative transfer has 
previously been reported with regard to cognitive skills, that is the Einstellung effect 
or mechanisation ofthought. This was illustrated by the Luchin's ( 1942) water jug 
experiments, where it was shown that participants will persistently use a solution 
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strategy that lms hcen demonstrated to work in the past, even when a simpler more 
crticicnt alternative is available (Anderson, 191J5). Consequently, Anderson (I CJI)5) 
argues negative transfer is a case of transferring information that is no longer useful 
rather than failure to transfer. It is in effect an example of perfect transfer of 
productions that lead to less than optimal perfonnancc and it is an argument that can 
equally be applied to the results of the alphabet-arithmetic task as well as to the 
reverse reading task. 
Another explanation for negative or zero transfer offered by Anderson ( 1 987) is 
working-memmy failure. Based on experiments with students designing computer 
programmes, Anderson and Jeffries (1985) found that 30% of errors made by 
students were related to working-memory failure. When the demands of one part of 
the programming procedure were increased, errors occurred in other parts, 
suggesting that there were capacity limits to working-memory. Previous research 
(Jeffries, Turner, Polson, & Atwood, 1981) also points to capacity overload as being 
a major contributor to individual differences between programmers. 
Anderson (1987) argues this is because loss of declarative infonnation from 
working-memory can "cause good productions to behave badli' (p. 203). In simple 
tenns, ifinfonnation is lost that is needed in an answer, the answer will not contain 
that infonnation and so will be deficient. This position also receives support from 
research comparing novice and expert perfonnance, which appears to indicate the 
only difference between the two is the ability of the expert to remember larger 
chunks of domain specific information (Chase & Erikson, 1982; Chase & Simon, 
1973; Egan & Swartz, 1979; Reitman, 1976; Speelman & Maybery, 1998). 
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In the cas~: of the present study it is hard to sec how any ofthcsc suggcstions can 
account for the poorer performance in phase 3 of the reverse reading task. It cannot 
he a case of loss of infonnation from working memory or the loss of dcclarative 
infonnation because phase 3 involved completely new items, thereforc no prior 
knowledge relating to these items existed to be 'lost from memory'. Rather it is more 
likely that the slower reaction times in phase 3 were an artefact of the task in that it 
simply took longer for participants to recognise the shapes of the reversed letters 
involved in this phase of the experiment. 
The savings analysis of phase three data was designed to assess the benefit derived 
from the learning that occurred in phase two. This method of assessing learning 
identifies unconscious as well as conscious learning, and as such is able to quantify 
levels of learning even when the participant is unable to verbalise what has been 
learned (Roediger, 1990). The results from phase three indicate that there was a 
saving of 70% in the algebra task, followed by 60% for reverse reading, 40% for the 
syllogism task and 30% in the alphabet-arithmetic task. 
This appears to suggest that the measure of transfer does not necessarily represent the 
entire benefit of past learning. The syllogism task showed the greatest amount of 
transfer at 48.4% compared with 38% in the algebra task, and yet in tenns of the 
savings measure the two tasks reverse their position with the algebra task 
demonstrating the greater savings (70% compared with 40% in the syllogism task). 
This implies that although RT's in the algebra task slowed at the beginning of the 
transfer phase, participants had learned the equation strategy so well in the training 
phase that this allowed a faster return to pre-transfer RT's than in the case of the 
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syllogism task. In other words, participants in this study were better able to Jearn the 
algorithm for solving the algebra equation than the ;_t/gorithm for solving the 
syJic,dsms. 
It is clear that the nature of' skill acquisition and transfer is directly related to the task 
involved. If a task contains properties that arc useful when applied to a different task 
it will result in general transfer. Conversely tasks that demonstrate specific transfer 
do so because they are inherently specific, that is there arc no general features in the 
task that can be incorporated in a general perfonnance strategy and so no such 
strategy can be developed that could facilitate transfer to another domain. Each of the 
four tasks described above differs in its capability to develop general skills; hence 
different types of transfer resulted as a function of the task being performed. 
The Logan (1988) and Masson (1986) experiments can be characterised as involving 
tasks where highly specific stimuli were experienced repeatedly. It is reasonable to 
assume that participants would develop strategies that relied heavily on memory, as 
this would be more efficient than generating new solutions. In the Speelman and 
Kirsner ( 1997) syllogism experiment, relying on memory would have been far more 
difficult than developing a solution that could be transposed to all new syllogisms. 
Likewise a reliance on memory in the algebra task as reported by Greig and 
Speelman (1998) was only beneficial in tenns of remembering one's times tables. 
Because the x- y pairings changed, memory for specific pairings would have been 
redundant, therefore a more general strategy was needed to solve the problems. 
The results ofthis study are consistent with the Anderson's ACT* theoty of skill 
acquisition but they present difficulties for Logan's instance theory as it presently 
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stands. The instance theory is unable to account lOr the level of' learning in phase one 
of the study where all flntr tasks demonstrated learning to some degree. As stated 
earlier the instance theory cannot explain how learning occurs in the ahscncc of 
repeated items. It is also unable to account for the transfer that occurred in the 
syllogism and algebra tasks when new items were presented in the transfer phase. 
However. as other researchers have illustrated (Palmeri, 1997; Speelman & Kirsner, 
1998) with slight modification the instance theory can be adjusied to align it with 
empirical evidence. 
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Appendix A 
Information Sheet 
The experiment in which you arc about to participate is designed to 
investigate some of the ways in which we acquire mental skills. It is 
being conducted as part of an Honours Degree and is being supervised by 
Dr. Craig Speelman, lecturer in Psychology. This experiment conforms to 
the guidelines produced by Edith Cowan University Committee for the 
Conduct of Ethical Research. 
In this experiment you will be required to perform some simple problem 
solving tasks. These will be presented on the computer screen and you 
will have to respond by using the mouse to click a button on the screen. 
You do not need to have done anything like this before and most of the 
participants will never have been involved in an experiment of this kind. 
The aim of the experiment is to examine the role of practice in mastering 
a task. Your participation will last approximately one hour. 
Please be assured that any information that you provide will be held in 
the strictest of confidence by the researcher. At no time will your name be 
reported along with your responses. All data will be reported in group 
form only. The results of the study will be available at the conclusion of 
the project, should you wish to have a copy sent to you tick the box at the 
bottom of the page. 
Please understand that your pm .. cipation in this research is totally 
voluntary and you are free to withdraw at any time during the study 
without penalty, and to remove any data that you may have contribmed. 
Any questions concerning this project can be directed to Dr. Craig 
Speelman (Supervisor) of the School of Psychology on 9400 5724. 
Thankyou for your interest in this project 
Dawn Darlaston- Jones 
Please send me a copy of the results at the end ofthe project ro 
Informed Consent 
I (the participant) have read the information above and any 
questions I have asked have been answered to my satisfaction. I agree 
to participate in this activity, realising that I may withdraw at any 
time. I agr·ee that research data gathered for the study may be 
published, provided I am not identifiable. 
Participant Date 
Investigator Date 
Appendix B- Stimulus Items 
Stimulus hems for Syllog,ism Task 
Phase I 
\.I All or the accountants arc blood donors. 
All of the blood donors arc cynics. 
1.2 All of the administrators arc celebrities. 
All of the celebrities arc nephews. 
1.3 All of the estate agents arc pilots. 
All of the pilots arc joggers. 
1.4 All of the ambassadors arc trumpeters. 
All of the trumpeters are blondes. 
1.5 All of the footballers are fathers. 
All of the arbiters are footballers. 
1.6 All of the country folk are clairvoyants. 
All of the architects are country folk. 
1.7 All of the travellers are gymnasts. 
All of the attomeys are travellers. 
1.8 All of the musicians are killers. 
All of the auctioneers are musicians. 
1.9 All of the auditors are readers. 
All of the readers are tenors. 
\.\() All of the bakers are lodgers. 
All of the lodgers are competitors. 
1.11 Ail of the ballerinas are collectors. 
All of the collectors are fascists. 
1.12 All of the bankers are performers. 
All of the performers are guardians. 
1.13 All of the jurors are drunks. 
All of the barbers arc jurors. 
1.14 All of the earls are sceptics. 
All of the beach inspectors are earls. 
1.15 All of the intellectuals are lovers. 
All ofthe beggars are intellectuals. 
1.16 All of the liars are martyrs. 
All of the bellydancers are liars. 
1.17 All ofthe boot makers are high jumpers. 
All of the high jumpers are traitors. 
1. 18 All ofthe botanists are heirs. 
All of the heirs are purists. 
1.19 All of the builders are Christians. 
All of the Christians are uncles. 
1.20 All ofthe buskers arc graduates. 
All ofthe graduates are perfectionists. 
2.21 All of the puppeteers are moralists. 
All of the butchers are puppeteers. 
2.22 All of the husbands are skiers. 
All ofthe butlers are husbands. 
2.23 All of the hunters arc cricketers. 
All of the carpenters arc hunters. 
2.24 All of' the mothers arc singers. 
All of the cashiers arc mothers. 
2.25 All of the chairmen arc landowners. 
All of the landowners arc cowards. 
2.26 All of the chauffeurs arc anglers. 
All of the anglers arc hedonists. 
2.27 All of the clerks arc gentlemen. 
All of the gentlemen arc murderers. 
2.28 All of the clinicians are honeymooners. 
All of the honeymooners are prisoners. 
2.29 All of the nationalists arc cardplayers. 
All of the cobblers arc nationalists. 
2.30 All of the cooks are drinkers. 
All of the colonels are cooks. 
2.31 All of the multilinguists are drummers. 
All of the commissioners are multi linguists. 
2.32 All of the naturalists are dukes. 
All of the comperes are naturalists. 
2.33 All of the constables are archers. 
All of the archers are marxists. 
2.34 All of the consuls are hurdlers. 
All of the hurdlers are extroverts. 
2.35 All of the coroners are whistlers. 
All of the whistlers are optimists. 
2.36 All of the councillors are marksmen. 
All of the marksmen are parents. 
2.3 7 All of the bachelors are boxers. 
All of the counterfeiters are bachelors. 
2.38 All of the voters are gardeners. 
All of the couriers arc voters. 
2.39 All of the meditators are pragmatists. 
All of the chemists are meditators. 
2.40 All of the baritones are landlords. 
All of the curators are baritones. 
3.41 All of the beans are bilinguals. 
All of the bilinguals are communists. 
3.42 All ofthe decorators are golfers. 
All of the golfers are bullies. 
3.43 All of the detectives are actors. 
All of the actors are sailors. 
3.44 All of the diplomats are rowers. 
All of the rowers are comedians. 
3.45 All of the connoisseurs are alarmists. 
All of the directors are connoisseurs. 
3.46 All of the authors are puritans. 
All of the doctors are authors. 
3.47 All of the millionaires are budhists. 
All of the dramatists are millionaires. 
3.48 All of the colonists arc alcoholics. 
All of the dransmcn arc colonists. 
3.49 All ofthc drovers arc aborigines. 
All of the aborigines :trc electors. 
3.50 All of the engineers arc debaters. 
All of the debaters arc runners. 
3.51 All of the historians arc entrepreneurs. 
All of the entrepreneurs arc ussassins. 
3.52 All of the evangelists arc householders. 
All of the householders arc longjumpcrs. 
3.53 All of the critics are riders. 
All of the foremen arc critics. 
3.54 All of the bouncers arc aristocrats. 
All of the foresters are bouncers. 
3.55 All of the novelists are acrobats. 
All of the gangsters are novelists. 
3.56 All of the students are behaviourists. 
All of the garbage collectors arc students. 
3.57 All of the grocers are housewives. 
All of the housewives are pianists. 
3.58 All of the security guards are capitalists. 
All of the capitalists are enthusiasts. 
3.59 All of the hostesses are knitters. 
All of the knitters are impressionists. 
3.60 All ofthe industrialists are knights. 
All of the knights are orators. 
4.61 All of the clowns are furriers. 
All of the insurance agents are clowns. 
4.62 All of the beekeepers are drug addicts. 
All of the interviewers are beekeepers. 
4.63 All of the in venters are burglars. 
All of the janitors are in venters. 
4.64 All of the caddies are satirists. 
All of the jewellers are caddies. 
4.65 All of the journalists are conjurers. 
All of the conjurers are drives. 
4.66 All of the lecturers are judges. 
All of the judges are organists. 
4.67 All ofthe gamekeepers are writers. 
All of the writers are draftees. 
4.68 All of the kitchenhands are pupils. 
All of the pupils are sculptors. 
4.69 All of the abductors are eccentrics. 
All of the labourers are abductors. 
4.70 All of the academics are gypsies. 
All of the lawyers are academics. 
4.71 All of the photographers are thieves. 
All of the librarians are photographers. 
4.72 All of the grammarians are soldiers. 
All of the locksmiths are grammarians. 
4.73 All of the magistrates arc hostages. 
All of the hostages arc violinists. 
4.74 All of the mathematicians arc marines. 
All of the marines arc barons. 
4.75 All of the mechanics arc spectators. 
All of the spectators arc ventriloquists. 
4.76 All of the neurologists arc scholars. 
All of the scholars arc advisers. 
4.77 All ofthc criminals arc vigncrons. 
All of the conductors arc criminals. 
4.78 All ofthc nurses arc nutritionists. 
All ofthc nuns arc nurses. 
4.79 All ofthc physiologists arc statesmen. 
All of the officials are physiologists. 
4.80 All of the teachers arc vocalists. 
All of the opticians are teachers. 
Phase I (Version 1) Conclusions 
1.1 T All of the accountants are cynics. 
1.2 F All of the nephews are administrators. 
1.3 T All of the estate agents are joggers. 
1.4 F All of the blondes are ambassadors. 
1.5 T All of the arbiters are fathers. 
1.6 F All of the clairvoyants are architects. 
1.7 T All of the attorneys are gymnasts. 
1.8 F All of the killers are auctioneers. 
1.9 T All of the auditors are tenors. 
1.10 F All of the competitors are bakers. 
1.11 T All of the ballerinas are fascists. 
1.12 F All of the guardians are bankers. 
1.13 T All of the barbers are drunks. 
1.14 F All of the sceptics are beach inspectors. 
1.15 T All ofthe beggars are lovers. 
1.16 F All of the martyrs are bellydancers. 
1.17 T All of the bootmakers are traitors. 
1.18 F All of the purists are botanists. 
1.19 T All of the builders are uncles. 
1.20 F All of the perfectionists are buckers. 
2.21 T All of the butchers are moralists. 
2.22 F All of the skiers are butlers. 
2.23 T All ofthe carpenters are cricketers. 
2.24 F All of the singers are cashiers. 
2.25 T All of the chairmen are cowards. 
2.26 F All of the hedonists are chauffeurs. 
2.27 T All of the clerks are murderers. 
2.28 F All of the prisoners are clinicians. 
2.29 T All of the cobblers are cardplayers. 
2.30 F All of the drinkers are colonels. 
2.31 T All of the commissioners urc drummers. 
2.32 F All of the dukes arc comperes. 
2.33 T All of the constables arc marxists. 
2.34 F All of the extroverts arc consuls. 
2.35 T All of tile coroners arc optimists. 
2.36 F All of the parents arc councillors. 
2.37 T All of the counterfeiters arc boxers. 
2.38 F All of the gardeners arc couriers. 
2.39 T All of the chemists arc pragmatists. 
2.40 F All of the landlords arc curators. 
3.41 T All of the deans arc communists. 
3.42 F All of the bullies are decorators. 
3.43 T All of the detectives are sailors. 
3.44 F All of the comedians are diplomats. 
3.45 T All of the directors are alarmists. 
3.46 F All of the puritans are doctors. 
3.47 T All of the dramatists are budhists. 
3.48 F All of the alcoholics are draftsmen. 
3.49 T All of the drovers are electors. 
3.50 F All of the runners are engineers. 
3.51 T All of the historians are assassins. 
3.52 F All of the longjumpers are evangelists. 
3.53 T All of the foremen are riders. 
3.54 F All ofthe aristocrats are foresters. 
3.55 T All of the gangsters are acrobats. 
3.56 F All of the behaviourists are garbage collectors. 
3.57 T All of the grocers are pianists. 
3.58 F All of the enthusiasts are security guards. 
3.59 T All of the hostesses are impressionists. 
3.60 F All of the orators are industrialists. 
4.61 T All of the insurance agents are furriers. 
4.62 F All of the drug addicts are interviewers. 
4.63 T All of the janitors are burglars. 
4.64 F All ofthe satirists are jewellers. 
4.65 T All of the journalists are drivers. 
4.66 F All of the organists are lecturers. 
4.67 T All ofthe gamekeepers are draftees. 
4.68 F All of the sculptors are kitchenhands. 
4.69 T All of the labourers are eccentrics. 
4.70 F All ofthe gypsies are lawyers. 
4.71 T All of the librarians are thieves. 
4.72 F All ofthe soldiers are locksmiths. 
4.73 T All ofthe magistrates are violinists. 
4.74 F All of the barons are mathematicians. 
4.75 T All of the mechanics are ventriloquists. 
4.76 F All of the advisers are neurologists. 
4.77 T All of the conductors are vignerons. 
4.78 F All of the nutritionists are nuns. 
4.79 T All of the officials are statesmen. 
4.80 F All of the vocalists are opticians. 
Phase II (Syllogisms A Version 2) 
All of the parliamentarians arc pessimists 
All of the pessimists arc artists. 
2 All of the pawnbrokers arc painters. 
All of the painters arc candidates. 
3 All or the pharmacists arc senators. 
All of the senators arc delinquents. 
4 All of the physicians are researchers. 
All of the researchers arc umpires. 
5 All of the spies arc waiters. 
All of the physicists are spies. 
6 All of the pedestrians are hockeyplayers. 
All of the plumbers are pedestrians. 
7 All of the observers are customers. 
All of the politicians are observers. 
8 All of the prefects are poets. 
All of the porters are prefects. 
9 All of the priests are pensioners. 
All of the pensioners are hennits. 
10 All of the theoreticians are referees. 
All of the psychologists are theoreticians. 
Phase 2 Conclusions 
1. T All of the parliamentarians are pessimists. 
F Ali of the pessimists are parliamentarians. 
2. TAll ofthe pawnbrokers are candidates. 
FAll of the candidates are pawnbrokers. 
3. TAll of the pharmacbts are senators. 
FAll of the senators are pham1acists. 
4. T All of the physicians are umpires. 
FAll of the umpires are physicians. 
5. TAll ofthe physicists are waiters. 
FAll of the waiters are physicists. 
6. TAll of the plumbers are hockeyplayers 
FAll of the hockey players are plumbers. 
7. TAll of the politicians are customers. 
F All ofthe customers are politicians. 
8. TAll ofthe porters are poets. 
FAll ofthe poets are porters. 
9. TAll of the priests are hermits. 
F All ofthe hermits are priests. 
10. TAll ofthe p'ychologists are referees. 
FAll of the referees are psychologists. 
Phase III 
All of the principals arc craftsmen. 
All of the crallsmcn arc philosophers. 
2 All of the printers arc servants. 
All of the servants arc henchmen. 
J All of the professors arc scientists. 
All of the scientists arc apologists. 
4 All of the statisticians arc marriage celebrants. 
All of the recruits arc statisticians. 
5 All of the tutors arc minstrels. 
All of the programmers arc tutors. 
6 All of the communicators are carvers. 
All of the secretaries are communicators. 
7 All of the tenors are accountants. 
All of the high jumpers are tenors. 
8 All of the competitors are administrators. 
All of the heirs are competitors. 
9 All of the puppeteers are drunks. 
All of the drunks are arbiters. 
10 All of the husbands are sceptics. 
All of the sceptics are architects 
Phase 3 Conclusions 
1. TAll of the principals are philosophers 
FAll of the philosophers are principals. 
2. TAll of the printers are henchmen. 
F All of the henchmen are printers. 
3. TAll of the professors are apologists. 
FAll of the apologists are professors. 
4. TAll of the recruits are marriage celebrants. 
FAll of the marriage celebrants are recruits. 
5. TAll of the programmers are minstrels. 
F All of the minstrels are programmers. 
6. T All of the secretaries arc carvers. 
FAll of the carvers are secretaries. 
7. TAll of the highjumpcrs are accountants. 
FAll of the accountmtts are highjumpers. 
8. TAll of the heirs arr..: administrators. 
FAll of the administrators are heirs. 
9. TAll of the puppeteers are arbiters. 
FAll of the arbiters are puppeteers. 
10. TAll of the husbands are architects. 
FAll of the architects are husbands. 
Stimulus Items for Alphabct~Arithmctic task 
Assumptions: 
Phase I w uses all letters awl & numhcrs 2~5 
so trials 20 no repetition or letters 
60 repetition but item is different 
Phase 2 - I 00 trials 
50 true- I 0 letters presented (A-J) always paid with the same 
number. 
50 false- as above except 25 true+ I & 25 true- 1 
Phase 3- as phase 2 but with letters K-T 
Phase I 
I. A+2~C TRUE 
2. B +3 ~ F FALSE +I 
3. C+4~0 TRUE 
4. D+S~H FALSE -I 
5. E +2~0 TRUE 
6. F+3~.1 FALSE +I 
7. 0+4~K TRUE 
8. H +5 ~L FALSE-I 
9. !+2~ K TRUE 
10. J+ 3 ~N FALSE +I 
ll.K+4~0 TRUE 
12.L+5~P FALSE-I 
13.M+2~0 TRUE 
14.N+3~R FALSE +I 
15.0+4~S TRUE 
16.P+5~T FALSE -1 
17. Q + 2 ~ s TRUE 
18. R + 3 ~ V FALSE +1 
19.S+4~W TRUE 
20. T+s~x FALSE-I 
21. A+ 3 ~ D TRUE 
22. B +4~ 0 FALSE +I 
23. C + 5 ~ H TRUE 
24.D +2 ~ E FALSE -I 
25. E + 3 ~ H TRUE 
26.F+4~K FALSE+! 
27. 0+5 ~ L TRUE 
28.H+2~I FALSE -I 
29. I+ 3 ~ L TRUE 
30.J+4~0 FALSE +1 
3l.K+5~P TRUE 
32. L + 2 ~ M 
JJ. M + 3 °0 I' 
34. N + 4 ~ R 
35.0 + 5 = T 
36. p + 2 ~ Q 
37.Q+3~T 
38. R + 4 ~ W 
39. S + 5 ~X 
40. T + 2 ~ U 
4l.A+4~E 
42. B + 5 ~ H 
43. C + 2 ~ E 
44. D + 3 ~ F 
45.E+4=1 
46. F + 5 = L 
47.G+2=1 
48. H + 3 =.I 
49. 1+4=M 
so . .I+ 5 = p 
5l.K+2=M 
52. L+3 =N 
53. M+4=Q 
54. N + 5 = T 
55.0 + 2 = Q 
56. P+ 3 =R 
57.Q+4=U 
58. R + 5 =X 
59. s + 2 = u 
60. T+J=V 
6l.A+5=F 
62. B + 2 = E 
63.C+3=F 
64. D+4=G 
65.E+5=J 
66. F + 2 =I 
67.G+3=J 
68. H +4=K 
69. I+S=N 
70. J+2 =M 
7l.K+3=N 
72. L+4=0 
73.M+5=R 
74. N+2=Q 
75.0+3=R 
76. P +4=S 
77.Q+5=V 
78. R + 2 =U 
79.S+3=V 
80. T+4=W 
FALSE -I 
TRUE 
FALSE +I 
TRUE 
FALSE -1 
TRUE 
FALSE +I 
TRUE 
FALSE -I 
TRUE 
FALSE +I 
TRUE 
FALSE-I 
TRUE 
FALSE +I 
TRUE 
FALSE-I 
TRUE 
FALSE +I 
TRUE 
FALSE-I 
TRUE 
FALSE +I 
TRUE 
FALSE-I 
TRUE 
FALSE +I 
TRUE 
FALSE -I 
TRUE 
FALSE +I 
TRUE 
FALSE -I 
TRUE 
FALSE +I 
TRUE 
FALSE -I 
TRUE 
FALSE +I 
TRUE 
FALSE -I 
TRUE 
FALSE +I 
TRUE 
FALSE -I 
TRUE 
FALSE +1 
TRUE 
FALSE-I 
Phase 2 
I. A+2~C TRUE 
2. A +2 ~ D FALSE +I 
3. B+3~E TRUE 
4. B+3~D FALSE-I 
5. C'+4~G TRUE 
6. C'+4~H FALSE +I 
7. D+ 5 ~I TRUE 
8. D +5 ~ H FALSE -I 
9. E+2~G TRUE 
IO.E+2~H FALSE +I 
li.F+3~1 TRUE 
12.F+3~H FALSE -I 
13.G+4~K TRUE 
14.G+4~L FALSE +I 
15.H+5~M TRUE 
16.H+5~L FALSE-! 
17.1 + 2 ~ K TRUE 
18.!+2~L FALSE+! 
19.J+3~M TRUE 
20. J + 3 ~ L FALSE -1 
REPEAT EACH ITEM 5 TIMES ~ I 00 TRIALS 
PRESENT IN RANDOM ORDER 
Phase 3 
\. K+2~ M TRUE 
2. K +2~ N FALSE +I 
3. L +3 ~o TRUE 
4. L+3~N FALSE -I 
5. M+4~Q TRUE 
G. M+4~R FALSE+! 
7. N+5 ~ S TRUE 
8. N+5=R FALSE -I 
9. 0+2~Q TRUE 
10.0+2~R FALSE+! 
ll.P+3~S TRUE 
12. P + 3 ~ R FALSE -I 
13.Q+4~U TRUE 
14.Q+4~V FALSE +I 
15.R+5~W TRUE 
J6.R+5~v FALSE -I 
17.S+2~U TRUE 
!8.S+2~V FALSE +I 
19. T+3~W TRUE 
20. T + 3 ~ V FALSE-I 
REPEAT EACH ITEM 5 TIMES ~ I 00 TRIALS 
PRESENT IN RANDOM ORDER 
Stimulus Items for Algebra Task 
Phase I 
-Item X y Presented Response 
I 3 5 2 T 
2 4 2 6 F 
3 5 9 9 F 
4 6 10 13 T 
5 7 I 24 T 
6 8 4 29 F 
7 9 3 40 F 
8 10 8 46 T 
9 II 7 57 T 
10 12 6 68 F 
II 3 I 4 T 
12 4 6 4 F 
13 5 5 II F 
14 6 6 15 T 
15 7 9 20 T 
16 8 10 26 F 
17 9 7 37 T 
18 10 4 49 F 
19 II 9 55 F 
20 12 10 67 T 
21 3 3 4 F 
22 4 4 6 T 
23 5 7 9 T 
24 6 8 13 F 
25 7 II 20 F 
26 8 12 26 T 
1 27 9 5 38 T 
28 10 6 46 F 
29 11 II 55 T 
30 12 8 69 F 
31 3 7 2 F 
32 4 8 4 T 
33 5 I II F 
34 6 2 17 T 
35 7 3 23 T 
36 8 2 30 F 
37 9 9 37 F 
38 10 10 45 T 
39 11 I 60 T 
40 12 12 65 F 
41 4 10 4 F 
42 6 12 12 T 
43 5 11 6 F 
44 12 2 71 T 
,.,.-------- -- -·-~--··--~ 45 7 5 15 T 
46 8 8 39 r 
47 9 II 34 F 
48 10 12 44 T 
49 II 3 59 T 
50 4 12 3 F 
51 12 4 69 F 
52 5 3 II T 
53 6 4 16 T 
54 7 7 22 F 
55 8 6 29 T 
56 9 I 39 F 
57 10 2 50 F 
58 II 5 58 T 
Phase 2 
Item X y Presented Response 
I 5 9 8 T 
2 5 II 6 F 
3 5 13 8 F 
4 5 15 5 T 
5 8 2 30 F 
6 8 4 30 T 
7 8 6 29 T 
8 8 8 29 F 
9 9 17 32 T 
10 9 19 30 F 
Repeat each item I 0 times 
Phase 3 
Item X y Presented Correct 
Response 
I 6 10 13 T 
2 6 12 13 F 
3 6 14 10 F 
4 6 16 10 T 
5 7 I 25 F 
6 7 3 23 T 
7 7 5 22 T 
8 7 7 20 F 
9 10 !8 41 T 
10 !0 20 41 F 
Repeat each item I 0 times 
Stimulus Items f'or reverse Reading Task 
phase I 
80 words using all letters 
first 10 with no leiters repeated 
I. sk * 
2. FLY 
3. ANT* 
4. ba 
5. RUM* 
6. run 
7. dome* 
8. lick 
9. HIKE* 
10. PROD 
11. ARRAY* 
12. FLEW 
l3.FOAM* 
14. GAIT 
15. GEAR* 
16. HERALD 
17. HOUSE* 
18. HURRY 
19. ISSUE* 
20. ITEM 
21. JACKET* 
22.JAPAN 
23. JUDGE* 
24.KEEN 
25. KERN* 
26.KNEE 
27. KNIGHT* 
28. LADDER 
29. LAGOON* 
30. LAID 
31. LAMP* 
32. LATIN 
33.LAUNCH* 
34. LEAGUE 
35. LEND* 
36. MAKER* 
37.MARBLE 
38. MARINE* 
39. MASS 
40. MILK* 
41. MINOR 
42.MONEY* 
HIGH 
BUZZ 
PANT 
HAND 
COME 
HIDE 
COMB 
CALL 
BIKE 
SHOE 
AWAY 
CAGE 
DOME 
FOIL 
SHEER 
HOLDER 
MOUSE 
HEAVY 
TISSUE 
IMMUNE 
PACKET 
BASIN 
BUDGE 
MOON 
TURN 
KNIFE 
BLIGHT 
KILLER 
SOON 
KIND 
STAMP 
DANCER 
PAUNCH 
SIEVE 
FRIEND 
BAKER 
STONE 
SCENE 
MORE 
SILK 
SMALL 
I-lONEY 
43. NAMELY HAPPY 
44. NATION* STATION 
45. NATURE INSIDE 
46. NUMBER* SLUMBER 
47. NUMERAL NEVER 
48. NURSE* PURSE 
49. OFFICE CHAIR 
50. ORDER* HOARDER 
51. ORGAN PLAYER 
52. PAINT* TAINT 
53. PLACE PUT 
54. PALM* BALM 
55. PAPER SUGAR 
56. PARK* STARK 
57. PENCIL PEOPLE 
58. PICKET* TICKET 
59. PICNIC PHRASE 
60. PISTOL* BRISTOL 
61. POTATO POWDER 
62. QUAfNT* PAINT 
63. QUEEN KING 
64. QUILL* SPILL 
65. QUOTE SPEEK 
66. RACE* FACE 
67.RADAR SAUCER 
68. RAISE* PRAISE 
69.RANCH FARM 
70.REMARK* PARK 
71. RESCUE RETAIN 
72. SCALE* SALE 
73. SHARK SHAPE 
74. TANGLE* DANGLE 
75. TEAR SHOUT 
76. TENNIS* MENACE 
77. VACANT VECTOR 
78. WANDER* PONDER 
79. WEIGHT WATCH 
80. YOGA* TOGA 
GROUP I-
LETTERS: ABDGI.IKNQSUVX - Phase 2 
WORDS MARKED WITH A* ARE THE RHYMING WORDS 
WORD IUIYME 
I. KINK* LINK 
2. AGAIN ADULT 
3. AID* MADE 
4. AIR JAR 
5. AKIN POLL 
6. AND* SAND 
7. ANNA ACID 
8. ASIAN PITY 
9. ASK* FLASK 
10. ASSIGN MERRY 
I I. AVID* RABID 
12. AXIS* PRAXIS 
13. BAD BLAND 
!4. BAN* FAN 
!5. BANANA FILE 
16. BAND* PLANNED 
17. BANG PORT 
18. BANK* TANK 
19. BASIS MAGIC 
20. BASK* ASK 
21. BASS RARE 
22. BAUD* FRAUD 
23. BIAS LOOSE 
24. BIB* RIB 
25. BID PINE 
26. BIN* SIN 
27. BIND VlOU' 
28. BUD* DUD 
29.BUDDING MAKING 
30. BUG* MUG 
31. BUGGING TAKING 
32.BUN* SUN 
33.BUNK CALM 
34. DAD* MAD 
35. DAIS SAGE 
;]6. DANK* THANK 
37. DJBS RAID 
38. DIG* FIG 
39.DAUB DRAG 
40. DIN* SIN 
41. DING DRINK 
42. DISDAIN* REFRAIN 
43. DISK DIVE 
44. DIVA* LEVER 
45. DUN PINK 
4(,. DUNK* SKUNK 
47. DUSK DREAM 
48. GAG* BAG 
49. GAUD GREEN 
50. GAIN* REMAIN 
51. GANG GAVE 
52. GIN* WIN 
53. GUN DUSK 
54. GUNK* JUNK 
55. INK EAR 
56. INNJNGS* WINNINGS 
57. ISIS RELY 
58. JAB* GRAB 
59. JAVA JADE 
60. JIG* RIG 
61. JUG JUMP 
62. JUNK* SUNK 
63.KAVA CAVE 
64. KID* BID 
65. KING HEAD 
66.KISS* MISS 
67. NIB NOSE 
68.NUN* SUN 
69.QUAD YEAR 
70. SAGA* TARGA 
71. SAID* DREAD 
72. SAND POUND 
73. SANK* BANK 
74. SANS HAIR 
75. SAVING* PAVING 
76. SIGN SALE 
77. SING* BRING 
78. SINK* DRINK 
79. SIX* TRICKS 
80. SKID SCRAPE 
81. SKIN* TIN 
82. SNUG SAME 
83. SQUAD* PROD 
84. SUDS BARN 
85. SUNG* TONGUE 
86.SUNK RUSH 
87. SUVA* HOOVER 
88. VAIN* RAIN 
89. VAN BET 
90. VISA* P!SA 
91. VIVA VIOLA 
92. VIVIAN* 
93. VIVID* 
94. SANG* 
95. SNAG* 
96. IBIS 
97. JINX* 
98. SNAG 
99. BUNG* 
IOO. GAS* 
GROUP 2- LETTERS: 
CEFHLMOPRTWYZ 
I. CELL* 
2. CHEER 
3. CHEF* 
4. CHEW 
5. CHOP* 
G. CHOW 
L CLOT* 
8. COFFEE 
9. COLE* 
!0. COLT 
II. COME* 
!2. COOLER 
!3. COPPER* 
!4. COPY 
15. CORE* 
!6. CLEF 
17. CREPT* 
!8. CREW 
!9. CROP* 
20. CROW 
21. ECHO 
22. ELECT* 
23. EMPLOY 
24. ERECT* 
25. ERROR 
26. FEET* 
27.FELLOW 
28. FELT* 
29. FERRY 
30. FLEET* 
31. FOWL 
32. FOOL* 
33. FOOT 
34. FORE* 
35.FORMER 
36. FORTY* 
37. FREE 
38. FROZEN 
phase 3 
BOLIVIAN 
LIVID 
BANG 
DRAG 
OPEN 
LYNX 
CRY 
LUNG 
LASS 
SPELL 
CLIFF 
DEAF 
CHEAP 
SHOP 
SAIL 
BLOT 
BELLY 
STOLE 
COLD 
SOME 
FOLDER 
SHOPPER 
COPE 
STORE 
PAPER 
SLEPT 
CROW 
STOP 
CLAW 
EDGE 
SELECT 
EMPIRE 
CORRECT 
ACORN 
FLEET 
BARROW 
MELT 
BELOW 
SLEET 
FORK 
SPOOL 
FEAR 
DOOR 
FERRY 
NAUGHTY 
FROG 
BOOK 
3~. HEEL* 
40. HELL* 
41. HELM 
42. HELP* 
43. HERE 
44. HERO* 
45. HOLE 
46. HOLY* 
47. HOMELY 
48. HOOP 
49. HOTEL* 
50. HOPE 
51. HOWL* 
52. LETTER 
53. LOOM* 
54. LOOP 
55. LORE* 
56. MEET 
57. MELT* 
58. MEMORY 
59.MERCY* 
60.MOLE 
61. MOTHER* 
62. LEFT 
63. PEOPLE 
64. POLE* 
65. POLL 
66. POLO* 
67. POMP 
68. POOL* 
69. POORLY 
70. PORCH* 
71. PORTER 
72. PREFER* 
73.PRETTY 
74.PYRE* 
75. RECTOR 
76. REFORM* 
77. RELY 
78. REMOTE* 
79. REPEL 
SO. RHYTHM 
81. ROOM* 
82. ROOT * 
83. ROPE* 
84. TEETH 
85. TEMPLE 
86. THEFT* 
87. THEME* 
88. THEORY* 
SEAL 
SPELL 
HOLD 
YELP 
SCAR 
ZERO 
PEARL 
SOLEY 
ARRAY 
GATE 
MOTEL 
LODGE 
SCOWL 
LUNCH 
DOOM 
MODE 
SAW 
SAID 
FELT 
AGENCY 
PERCY 
ARCH 
BROTHER 
MILK 
PERSON 
SOLE 
POND 
SOLO 
PUSH 
STOOL 
QUICKLY 
TORCH 
DECAY 
REFER 
TODDY 
FIRE 
SANDY 
PERFORM 
TEDDY 
PROMOTE 
CANDLE 
SHOE 
TOMB 
BOOT 
POPE 
BOX 
TOWER 
LEFT 
TEAM 
TEARY 
89. TORE SHOW 
90. TORY* STORY 
91. TOTE CALF 
92. TROOP* STOOP 
93. TROPHY .JOURNEY 
94. TYPE* WIPE 
95. WELL CAR 
96. WEPT* CREPT 
97. WERE SEEN 
98. WHEEL* REAL 
99. WOLF FOX 
I 00. YELLOW* MELLOW 
